Writing to queens while crises proceed: In memory of Manuel Jacinto Nunes by Braga de Macedo, Jorge
 
 
 
 
Writing to Queens while Crisis Proceed  
In Memory of Manuel Jacinto Nunes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expanded edition with the support of 
Madeira Development Company 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macedo, Jorge Braga de (ed.) 
Writing to Queens while Crisis Proceed  
In Memory of Manuel Jacinto Nunes  
Publishing: Instituto de Investigação Cientifica Tropical (IICT) and Center for 
Globalization and Governance at NOVA School of Business and Economics 
2nd edition – April 2015 
Design: Tiago Ribeiro 
Print: Aos Papeis 
100 ex.  
Sponsor: Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da Madeira (SDM) 
  
3 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
PREFACE BY FRANCISCO COSTA 
CHAPTER 1 EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 2 JORGE BRAGA DE MACEDO (JBM) LETTERS TO QUEENS 
CHAPTER 3 RUI VILELA MENDES (RVM) MATHEMATICS AND THE SUBPRIME 
CRISIS: LESSONS FOR THE NEXT STAGES 
CHAPTER 4 RENATO FLORES (RF) WHILE THE CRISIS PROCEEDS: A WORLD 
REDISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC POWER? 
CHAPTER 5 JOSÉ F. SANTOS (JFS) THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
CHAPTER 6 RUI MALHÓ (RM) A CELL BIOLOGIST NAIVE APPROACH 
CHAPTER 7 2011 PRE-CONFERENCE REPORT AND ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS 
CHAPTER 8 ANTÓNIO S. PINTO BARBOSA JACINTO NUNES: A VISIONARY OF 
THE FISCAL PROBLEM 
CHAPTER 9 JEAN-PIERRE CONTZEN (JPC) FOSSIL FUELS IN CPLP: SOME 
COMMENTS 
CHAPTER 10 JORGE BRAGA DE MACEDO ENERGY@CPLP DRIVES PORTUGAL’S 
STRATEGY FOR OPEN ECONOMY 
 
4 
 
 
  
5 
 
 
Preface 
Francisco Costa 
 
In November 1984, a conference called “Madeira: Pensar o Futuro” (freely translated 
as “Madeira: Thinking the Future”) was held in Funchal, capital city of the Portuguese 
archipelago. As suggested by the title, the main purpose of the conference was to analyse 
and debate the particular conditions of the small island economy, in order to identify 
opportunities and strategies for its future growth and development, in sustainable terms 
adjusted to its permanent constraints, namely those resulting from its small dimension, 
isolation and insularity, that were later taken into consideration by the then EEC (at the 
Rhodes European Council, in 1988) to classify Madeira as an “outermost region”. 
The promoter of the conference, the Commercial and Industrial Association of 
Funchal (ACIF), organized it in three panels, each dedicated to specific subjects. The third 
panel was particularly relevant since it was aimed at evaluating the international economy’s 
most relevant aspects and trends as well as broad conditions, references and opportunities 
emanating therefrom that ought to be taken in mind for the debate over the future of the 
Madeira economy. 
Among the many prominent academics and experts on economic matters that were 
invited and participated in the conference, a special reference should be made to Professors 
Manuel Jacinto Nunes and Jorge Braga de Macedo who made up the third panel, together 
with two international economists, Alan Greenspan and Guenter Reimann. 
In addition to the presence of Alan Greenspan, who became Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board but did not maintain further connections to Madeira, and Guenter Reimann, 
who, on the contrary, since 1977, had already been providing advice on matters related to 
the envisaged diversification and modernization of the island’s economy, the conference 
should be remembered and celebrated as the debut of the interest and attention paid by the 
other two aforesaid participants to the subjects covered and to the initiatives that had actually 
been taken, along the lines then discussed and identified. 
6 
 
 
As a matter of fact, the process that had already started for the creation and 
development of the International Business Centre of Madeira (IBCM), largely driven by the 
activity of ACIF and of the Madeira Development Company (SDM), was significantly 
enhanced by the debates and conclusions of the conference, and many of the participants, 
including Professor Manuel Jacinto Nunes, enthusiastically supported its fundamental 
options and objectives. It was then only a natural development that, in 1987, when SDM was 
officially granted the concession of the IBCM, Manuel Jacinto Nunes was invited and 
became President of its Advisory Council and, in that capacity, closely accompanied and 
supported SDM’s activities in the following years. The presence and positive influence of 
Manuel Jacinto Nunes in this process was later substantially increased when, in 1990, he was 
elected President of the General Assembly of SDM, maintaining always a very close 
relationship with the executive leadership of the company. 
When I was recently informed about the intention to dedicate the expanded edition 
of this book to the memory of Manuel Jacinto Nunes, and was asked to write its short preface 
I could only but accept enthusiastically and try to correspond adequately, not only as a 
testimony to the example and outstanding role played by Professor Manuel Jacinto Nunes in 
the setting up and development of SDM and the IBCM, where I was the fortunate direct 
beneficiary of his support and incentive, but also because the invitation was made by 
Professor Jorge Braga de Macedo who, with the same spirit, was his alternate and is now his 
successor in SDM. 
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Chapter 1 
Editor’s Introduction 
 
0. Dedication and Acknowledgements 
The economic and scientific potential of the Community of Portuguese-speaking 
Countries (CPLP) should enhance the cultural legacy of its nine members. Though most of 
them have ignored the complementarity, Portuguese export firms associated to ELO - a 
business association for development and cooperation with emerging markets - are 
promoting the new conception of CPLP and implementing a strategy for open economy. 
Taking stock of the project of writing to a fictional Portuguese-speaking Queen - after the 
Letter on the 2008 global financial crisis written to Queen Elizabeth by the British Academy 
- this expanded edition seeks to raise awareness of the issue addressed in a booklet with the 
same - admittedly elliptic – title, published in 2013.  
The project reflects partnerships set in motion at the margin of the 2008 board 
meeting of Madeira Development Company (SDM) and it is dedicated to the memory of its 
honorary chairman Manuel Jacinto Nunes (1926-2014), who supported the project as dean 
of the economics section at the Lisbon Academy of Science (ACL).  
The cover of the proceedings of a conference held at the Tropical Research Institute 
(IICT) is reproduced in the front flap, together with that of a book launched there. The titles 
of the book, Ethics, Crisis and Society, and of the conference, Science in the Tropics, 
underline the broad interdisciplinary and geographical reach of “global lusophonia”, which 
includes CPLP members and observers as well as their areas of integration, beginning with 
the Euro Zone (EZ). The black flat reproduces the back cover and the reprint of my 
contribution to the book, where the project labeled Letter to Queen Lusophonia (LQL) was 
first described1.  
LQL has been discussed at ACL thanks to the commitment of members of the 
economics and physics sections (respectively 6th and 2nd) in the humanities and science 
                                                          
1 Renaud and Marcelo (2011, 91 note 1 in fine). Ibid., p. 144, note 36 there are references to writings on the 
crisis by members of the economics section including Jacinto Nunes (2009) and Pitta Cunha (2009) and to 
items listed in Chapter 7 (1 by Sousa Andrade and 5 by Cardoso) as well as Chapter 3 and Contzen (2010).  
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classes, including foreign members of both classes as well as of the technology and society 
class of Académie Royale de Belgique (ARB). The pre-existing material from LQL has been 
used in courses involving the Center for Globalization and Governance (CG&G) at Nova 
School of Business and Economics (NOVASBE) and this expanded edition is directed to the 
new course on Globalization and Governance offered in the masters program this spring.  
The partnership with CG&G was crucial in the 125th and 130th anniversary 
celebrations of IICT. Its integration into ULisboa (the result of a merger between the former 
classical and technical universities of Lisbon) should enhance tropical knowledge there and 
at Nova. The spirit of inter-university collaboration was certainly present when these three 
Lisbon universities granted an honorary doctorate to Paul Krugman, a foreign member of 
ACL (27/02/12). Similarly, ACL’s Institute for Advance Study signed an agreement with 
IICT and CG&G (18/02/08) and convened a workshop dealing with Energy@CPLP 
(25/02/15), where the progress of LQL was also presented.  
The cover shows a crown with nine CPLP flags in the form of number seven rising 
from gentler waves than those in the illustration of Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom (used 
in the back flap). Tiago Ribeiro and Laura Domingues, both of IICT, created the cover and 
reviewed the text respectively. Sónia Oliveira and João Pereira dos Santos, teaching 
assistants at NOVASBE, helped prepare this material for the Globalization and Governance 
course. Thanks are due to them and to Francisco Costa, CEO of SDM, for relentless support. 
 
1. Seven years on 
Sete anos de pastor Jacob servia…/Começa a servir outros sete anos, 
Dizendo “Mais servira, se não fora/ para tão longo amor tão curta a vida”.  
 
The lyrics excerpted above were sung by Amália as fado2. The notion of fate, in 
addition to the biblical origin of the story, highlight familiarity with seven year cycles as 
                                                          
2 Amália Rodrigues sang several poems by Luís de Camões from 1965, this one appearing in her 1990 
Obsession album. “For seven years, the shepherd Jacob slaved…/ But he starts all over again, for seven more 
years,/ Saying “If life wasn’t so short, beginning right now, /I serve even longer for Rachel, the love of my 
life.” I confined to a footnote the only translation I am aware of because Baer (2008, p. 147) has no rhythm. As 
pointed out in the review by White (2006), it “offers us the first substantial selection of Camões' sonnets for 
more than a century, and should be welcomed for that reason alone...But even a labour of love can be 
laborious...Camões' Portuguese, in its wit, lucidity and extreme economy of expression, occupies the left-hand 
pages. Baer's English - normally the more succinct of the two languages - sprawls over the right hand as diction 
and prosody are sacrificed in the search for rhymes...These are not sonnets, rather prose-cribs chopped up, with 
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well as perplexity about the current economic conjuncture. Jacinto Nunes, to whose memory 
this edition is dedicated, favored the complementarity between the European and lusophone 
pillars of Portuguese foreign policy over more than seventy years of academic and public 
service. In my own tribute to him (Macedo, 2014), I enlist our common mentor and friend 
António Manuel Pinto Barbosa (1917-2006) and my father Jorge Borges de Macedo (1921-
96) among the few who hold the view that the European and lusophone allegiances are 
complementary, even though in foreign policy practice they have often been substitutes. 
Drawing on Jacinto’s memoirs, I further claim that he ensured the transition between Pinto 
Barbosa and José da Silva Lopes at the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank and that 
he helped bring together Cavaco Silva, the current President of the Republic, and his 
predecessor Ramalho Eanes in the run up to the second IMF stabilization package in 1983.  
The complementarity coming from “multiple allegiances as fate” (Macedo, 1995) 
became "global lusophonia" at a conference held at NOVASBE on 9 May, 2007 in memory 
of Borges de Macedo. As it turns out, the event was organized with José Luís Cardoso, who 
was Jacinto’s close disciple at the Institute of Economics and Management and is now 
director of the Institute of Social Studies at ULisboa. Quoting from the abstract in English 
of Macedo et al. (2009, 9), the paper presented by Luís Brites Pereira, deputy director of 
CG&G, “embeds the current wave of globalization in a long run perspective and tries to tease 
out from historical evolution signals about how to design the best strategy to meet the 
challenges that the current wave requires” 3. 
As is well known, during the second wave of globalization from the 1850s until 1914, 
business cycles were a major topic in political economy. During the Great Depression, they 
motivated the Keynesian revolution and national income accounting. After the 2nd World 
War, the North Atlantic security community enjoyed economic growth, full employment and 
low inflation over 30 glorious years, as rising interdependence was monitored by the OECD. 
In the 1970s, a wage explosion and two oil crises created stagflation but growth resumed in 
the 1980s: the Great Moderation lasted for another quarter century. Claims that business 
                                                          
slack rhythms and conventional diction, crucified on the rhyme scheme. Despite the lavish academic 
encomiums that accompany this volume, Camões' lyrics await a poet's translation”. In comparison with the 
biblical narrative, the “economy of expression” is indeed extreme in Camões’ sonnet. 
3 The proceedings collect nine essays in the tradition of Borges de Macedo, two of which in English. Cardoso 
subsequently translated his essay into English as “Jorge Borges de Macedo: Problems of the History of 
Portuguese Economic and Political Thought in the Eighteenth-Century” and published it in Porto in 2013. 
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cycles were dead in the OECD areas did not fail to notice sustained growth in China, 
spreading to Asia, Latin America and Africa. Even financial turmoil in some emerging 
markets at the turn of the century was met with benign neglect so that nobody saw the "blue 
eyed crisis" coming. Seven years on, acceptance is combined with fear of Secular Stagnation, 
a perverse twist to the proclaimed death of the business cycle.  
 
2. Jacinto’s choice 
The LQL project sought to turn the sympathy towards economists shown by the 
British Academy in their Letter to Queen Elizabeth in 2009 into an interdisciplinary inquiry 
from the perspective of the European South West – where the conquest of Ceuta in 1415, 
described in book IV of Camões’ epic poem The Lusiads, led to what became the first wave 
of globalization.  In addition to the historical roots, the subsequent repercussions of the EZ 
crisis on the Portuguese economy were central in my tribute to Pinto Barbosa upon 
occupying his chair 18L, distributed with what would be Jacinto’s last academic writing 
(Macedo, 2013c). LQL fits the role of the former dean of Portuguese economists, President 
of ACL, Minister of Finance and Governor of the Central Bank well: even the popular sonnet 
“Seven years…” echoes the closing promise of “monitoring the grave financial crisis we are 
going through” (Jacinto Nunes, 2008b, p. 159)”. 
The process itself was determined at the beginning of the fateful year by three 
seemingly unrelated events. First, in January, I became director of CG&G, the new name for 
the interdisciplinary and comparative research center on Portugal’s structural reforms 
created during the first presidency of the European Council (21/04/92), by agreement 
between myself as Minister of Finance and Manuel Pinto Barbosa, then Rector of Nova. 
CG&G helped organize the 125th anniversary celebrations of IICT, created on 19 April, 1883 
in the run up to the Berlin conference, and turned into a state laboratory dedicated to tropical 
knowledge in natural sciences and history with which Nova had been collaborating since 
October 19804. The IICT celebrations included a multi stakeholder conference trying to bring 
                                                          
4 In 1985 I had been asked to run IICT’s Center for Social Economics and contributed to the creation of the 
ELO, the business association promoting “economic lusophonia” ten years before the foundation of CPLP. 
Upon returning from the OECD, I was appointed President of IICT and promptly signed cooperation 
agreements with CPLP and its Business Council in 2004. In 2012, the supervision of IICT moved from the 
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together natural and social sciences for tropical development, to be held in September and 
addressed Science and Technology and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)5. 
Second, in February, I signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ACL’s Institute for 
Advanced Studies (IAE). The objective was to foster interdisciplinary research and tropical 
knowledge and it fit the agenda of the 6th section since Cardoso was himself on IAE’s board6. 
Third, in March, I traveled to Funchal for the board meeting of SDM, together with the 
presidents of the board and audit committee, respectively Jacinto Nunes and Paulo de Pitta 
e Cunha, who were also dean and deputy dean of the 6th section (Economics and Finance) of 
the humanities class at ACL - of which I had just become a member. There we decided to 
foster the section’s activities, beginning with an innovative way to select a foreign member 
that could succeed the late James Tobin, elected in 1981, when he also was awarded an 
honorary doctorate by Nova7.  
Meeting two weeks after the dean’s death on 14 July, the entire section welcomed the 
idea of honoring his memory8. In reverse chronological order, tributes have been expressed 
by: Pitta e Cunha at the board meeting of SDM, on 9 March, 2015; António Pinto Barbosa, 
in a note dated November 27, 2014 translated into English as chapter 8; Macedo (2014) and 
- even before the section met as becomes a close disciple - Cardoso, in Expresso, 18 July. 
Seven years after the Funchal moment, we honor the memory of our former dean, who 
contributed decisively to both the launch of LQL and the involvement of ACL in Krugman’s 
Lisbon TriDoc in 2012 (Macedo, 2013b). Silva Lopes, also active in LQL, was elected 
successor to Jacinto’s chair 8L (24/02/15). This was the natural choice as they had both 
                                                          
Ministry of Science to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The objective of integrating IICT in a Lisbon University 
appeared in the Contzen report of spring 2013 and the choice of ULisboa surfaced in the fall. 
5 Given the strong collaboration initiated in 2004 with the Executive Secretariat of CPLP and of its Business 
Council, IICT had carried out in 2007 a study on the MDGs, with the purpose of monitoring the 2006 Bissau 
declaration on MDGs in CPLP. This report was carried out with the help of NOVASBE. Note also that the 
Secretariat of the CPLP Business Council was initially located at ELO. 
6 Jacinto Nunes had also chaired IAE. The latest successor of Cardoso at IAE is Michel Renaud, from the 3rd 
section (Philosophy, Philosophy, Psychology and Education Science) of the humanities class, organizer of the 
interdisciplinary conference whose proceedings were launched at IICT. IAE also facilitated the workshop on 
Energy@CPLP, based on the proposal presented to the President of ACL by Rui Vilela Mendes and myself. 
7 The process of selection of possible Tobin’s successors in a ballot including all members of the 6th section 
also involved Cardoso, the third ranking member of the 6th section, and Silva Lopes, who advocated the 
submission of the two candidates with more votes, Paul Krugman and Olivier Blanchard. Until his death, 
Jacinto Nunes never tired of helping the section, and Pitta e Cunha, his successor, is doing the same. 
Throughout, I have served as informal secretary, aka “mailbox”.  
8 The minutes are available at http://www.jbmacedo.com/acl/nota6secfin.pdf.  
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become associate in the 1970s and he had managed to convince Jacinto Nunes to write his 
memoirs in 2008, an already quoted book titled “loose memories”! Though Jacinto’s widow 
warned me that he wrote it in a hurry, I found Memórias Soltas to be a precious guide to the 
unique way in which he managed to be “economist and citizen” since the late 1940s. On 
page 16, after he confesses having written on Stefan Zweig, Wittgenstein, Camões and 
others, he declares his interest in the philosophy of science; on page 159, before ending, he 
quotes his last presentation to ACL, titled “Methodological Individualism – the 
microfoundation of macroeconomics”9.  
 
3. From tropical knowledge to global lusophonia 
While the original conference on the 2008 crisis was postponed, as detailed below, 
the publication of this expanded edition shows that the desired interdisciplinary debate about 
“global lusophonia” has been taking place10. On 30/09/08, the planned multi-stakeholder 
conference took place at the Macau Cultural and Scientific Center at the margin of the 15th 
Executive Committee meeting of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR, housed at the World Bank) where IICT represents Portugal and at the 
general assembly (under IICT presidency of the European Consortium for Agricultural 
Research in the Tropics (now AGRINATURA). The Lisbon Declaration on Science and 
Technology for Global Development, drafted by Jean-Pierre Contzen, chairman of the 
organizing committee, member of ARB and foreign associate of ACL, called for other 
academies and research universities to adopt a public debate agenda involving more 
economic and interdisciplinary work11. Work by OECD on statistics, the United Nations 
University and the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) was also 
presented.  
                                                          
9 As he was not able to proof read, I was asked by the widow (herself NOVASBE’s first librarian), and by 
ACL’s secretary-general (herself a biologist who addressed the CGIAR meeting in Lisbon), to complete the 
references. Thanks to the diligence of the successor of Lutgarda Nunes and to the patience of Salomé Pais, I 
managed to complete Jacinto Nunes (2008a). 
10 This is reflected in Chapter 10, where I see energy issues as one emerging driver of Portugal’s strategy for 
open economy, capitalizing on the wave of “lusophilia” (Bloomfield, 2012, 33). 
11 The Declaration is mentioned in Renaud and Marcelo (2011, note 29 p. 128). Chapter 10 builds on the two 
papers presented at the Energy@CPLP Workshop and provides a link to Contzen (2013a). 
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An inaugural address by Contzen (2013a), Chapters 2, 5, 6 and 7 of this book and a 
self-evaluation after nine years in office (Macedo, 2013a) were recorded in a DVD (IICT, 
2013), with Harry Clarke’s 1919 illustration of Edgar Allan Poe’s Descent into the 
Maelstrom on the back cover. The reason was that the story had been used as a motivational 
metaphor for Ethics, Crisis and Society, with a large, swirling body of water pictured on the 
front and back covers of Renaud and Marcelo (2011). In the 1841 short story, survival came 
from the cask rather than the boat:  
“I resolved to lash myself securely to the water cask upon which I now held, to cut it 
loose from the counter, and to throw myself with it into the water. I attracted my 
brother's attention by signs, pointed to the floating barrels that came near us, and did 
everything in my power to make him understand what I was about to do. I thought at 
length that he comprehended my design - but, whether this was the case or not, he shook 
his head despairingly, and refused to move from his station by the ring-bolt”.  
 
At the book launch, Contzen mentioned the art of navigating the straits of Messina 
and accompanied it with a call for “renewed ethics for a society at peace, more resilient to 
crises”12.  
 
4. Seeing crises coming 
Perhaps more than on duration, narratives depend on the story’s defining moments, 
especially the beginning. The stages of the business cycle are systematically dated but, when 
crises are seen as “great”, their end may not be as easy to recognize. This applies to the Great 
Depression, sometimes seen as ending with the 2nd World War, and to the Great Recession, 
whose end has not been declared. Yet, “few advanced countries have returned to pre-crisis 
growth rates despite years of near-zero interest rates. Worryingly, the recent growth is 
fragranced with hints of new financial bubbles” (Teulings and Baldwin, 2014, 1).  
In 1938, nine years after the beginning of the Great Depression, Alvin Hansen 
wondered whether there would be sufficient investment demand to sustain future economic 
growth. What came to be known as the hypothesis of secular stagnation (dubbed SecStag), 
                                                          
12 «Mettons en lumière les raisons d’espérer; ne prenons pas à la lettre la belle image du maelstrom qui engloutit 
tout, ce maelstrom, glorifié par Edgard Allan Poe et Jules Verne qui n’est, à vrai dire, qu’une particularité de 
la dynamique des fluides, devenue simple attraction touristique dans certaines parties du monde. Suivons 
l’exemple de ces marins siciliens qui avaient acquis l’art de naviguer entre Charybde et Scylla et utilisons notre 
pouvoir de penser pour créer un nouveau dynamisme basé sur une éthique renouvelée dans une société apaisée, 
plus résiliente aux crises ». This is skipped in Contzen (2013b). 
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raises issues of special concern in Europe, Japan and US about: “the economy’s long run 
potential growth rate, about the deviation of actual growth from its potential and of one-off 
changes in the level of GDP without a change in the long-run growth rate”. The “structural 
headwinds” that are mentioned in connection with diminished long run growth potential are 
technology, demography, education, inequality and public debt though their comparative 
effect on secstag is disputed. Yet there is agreement that the very low level of the real interest 
rate “is a clear sign of excess saving”13. 
Geographical scopes also differ in these two “great” crises. The failure of Lehman 
Brothers was immediately seen as a global crisis while the 1929 crash in the US stock market 
may have been slower in crossing the North Atlantic but the implications of the 2007 
subprime crisis were also seen as negligible on the US economy, let alone in Europe.  
This perception remains after seven years and its implications for the economics 
profession resonated almost immediately: on 5 November, 2008 during a visit to the London 
School of Economics, Queen Elizabeth questioned the ability of economists to predict the 
crisis. The response came in the form of a letter “signed by LSE professor Tim Besley, a 
member of the Bank of England monetary policy committee, and the eminent historian of 
government Peter Hennessy”, as members of the British Academy. “The letter blames “a 
failure of the collective imagination of many bright people” and “tells of the ‘psychology of 
denial’ that gripped the financial and political world in the run-up to the crisis”14.  
ACL’s 6th section met on the first anniversary of the Queen’s visit, to agree on a 
tentative program for an interdisciplinary conference designed to illustrate the popular 
perception of economists following the global crisis15. It featured Paul Krugman and Olivier 
                                                          
13 Teulings and Baldwin (2014, p. 13) mention Jean Tirole’s 1985 paper on “rational bubbles” and find Europe 
and China especially susceptible to this “paradox of ageing societies” (pp. 3-22). 
14Quotes are from Stuart (2009), who reports on the letter as follows: “A letter was group of eminent economists 
has written to the Queen explaining why no one foresaw the timing, extent and severity of the recession. The 
three-page missive, which blames ‘a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people’, was sent after 
the Queen asked, during a visit to the London School of Economics, why no one had predicted the credit 
crunch… Professor Luis Garicano, to whom the Queen directed her question when she visited the LSE in 
November last year, said: “She seemed very interested, and she asked me: 'How come nobody could foresee 
it?' I think the main answer is that people were doing what they were paid to do, and behaved according to their 
incentives, but in many cases they were being paid to do the wrong things from society's perspective.” The 
article has a picture of Garicano showing the Queen graphs under the title “managing the credit crunch”. See 
also Pierce (2008). 
15 Garrido (2010). The conference, sponsored by Banco de Portugal, was to take place in the spring of 2011 but 
had to be postponed due to the deterioration of Portugal’s economy and polity which led to the bail-out request 
on April 7.  
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Blanchard, the two candidates to foreign members who were elected by the class in 2010. 
The outcome desired by the project also involved a letter but the message would differ from 
that of the Letter to Queen Elizabeth on two counts. Instead of asserting the “psychology of 
denial” in terms of economics and humanities, with an Anglo-American focus, as the British 
Academy had done, ACL would add to the economists interested members of its physics and 
biology sections, such as Rui Vilela Mendes and Rui Malhó, and broaden the geographical 
focus towards CPLP.  
 
5. From fiction to reality, fast and slow 
As a consequence of this bifurcation and of the observed duration of the crises, we 
add additional chapters to the booklet with the same title in IICT (2013). Poe’s uncanny 
message of hope is consistent with the rational nature and presence of mind of the only 
survivor, who has been compared to the narrator of The Pit and the Pendulum as he shows 
himself to be far more capable than he modestly describes. The same can be said of the 
protagonist of a novel where a European journalist attempting to report on events in Ukraine, 
faces forces that appear to be natural but turn out to be man-made. In spite of the subtitle of 
the novel (Costa, 2014), from fiction to reality, rationality is consistent with hope and 
modesty, just like in Poe’s short story and in LQL16. The “together alone” paradox in the 
international order derives from the observation that potential cooperative solutions are not 
applied domestically and internationally. The coexistence of a global crisis with national 
policy responses casts doubt on the “never again issue” in the agenda of the British Academy. 
Hence LQL is supposed to avoid “group think” (Tett, 2009) of advanced (blue-eyed?) 
countries. 
The debate encompassing humanities and social sciences as well as natural sciences 
on the one hand and a diversity of CPLP perspectives is deepened and widened in the 
Chapters by José F. P. Santos, professor of practice at Cambridge and MIT, an associate of 
                                                          
16
 My contribution to Renaud and Marcelo (2011, pp. 91-159) deconstructs the Letters to Queen Elizabeth in 
section 2, summarizes the interaction between globalization and governance in section 3, deals with flexible 
European integration in section 4 and includes an appendix on multilateral surveillance procedures. Of the close 
to 50 pages, only pp. 95-105 from section 2 and 117-128 from section 3 are summarized in chapter 2, sections 
1 through 4 and 10 while pp. 111-114 from section 3 are summarized in chapter 10. References were skipped 
but the list is now common to Chapters 1 and 2.  
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CG&G, and by Malhó, an associate in the 5th section of ACL’s science class first presented 
at the LQL project session of 24/02/12, (Macedo, 2013b). As the epicenter of the crisis 
moved to the EZ, and Greece, Ireland and Portugal sought financial assistance from the 
European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, the 
project’s focus shifted to graduate courses at NOVASBE featuring emerging markets, such 
as African Development Successes in 2010 and 2011 (building on Africa vs. Brazil and China 
offered in 2009). The 1st Pre-Conference on “Interdisciplinary perspectives on the Global 
Financial Crisis” held at ACL, included five papers; abstracts are reproduced in Chapter 7 
for Chapters 2 and 3, together with presentations by Contzen at ACL and ARB.  
Chapter 3 reproduces a 2011 paper by Vilela Mendes who qualifies the claim that 
excessive reliance on mathematical models was blamed as the cause for the subprime 
collapse and the subsequent global crisis by analyzing a few cases, showing that not paying 
attention to the mathematics was more profitable in the short term. Chapter 4 reproduces the 
2011 paper by Renato Flores, of Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, who uses the 
fall of Constantinople in 1453 as a defining moment of a forgotten crisis (abstract is in 
Chapter 7). In so doing, he draws attention to the fact that not only emerging powers but 
other regions of the world as well may be offering different development models and may 
constitute into alternative, in some dimensions more positive, agents, in the conduct of the 
present stage of globalization, a point echoed in Currie-Adler et al. (2014, where Flores wrote 
the chapter on Brazil, 667-682). That said, he claims that traditional Western powers have 
not lost a large amount of control of the world economy. And the crisis proceeds, reallocating 
world power as in a Hobbesian anarchy where multilateralism seems to be losing ground and 
turf wars becoming more frequent. As economic policy becomes even more involved with 
defense and security affairs, the feedbacks from each side to the other seem likely to keep 
dissent and animosity high. The ability to move from vicious to virtuous circles, certainly 
the synonym for development coming out of the numerous case studies in Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012), is another way of describing a positive G&G interaction. The secstag 
debate remains mostly focused on advanced countries but it is of relevance for development 
practice to the extent that it may bring forth a negative G&G interaction. Though “both the 
generation of ideas of development and their application in practice can be properly 
understood only within their particular historical, political and institutional 
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contexts...contemporary thinking on development is increasingly generated in a more diverse 
set of locations, while policy-makers are also progressively going beyond the intellectual 
capitals that loomed large in the past” (Currie-Alder, 2014, 14-15). This is in stark contrast 
with West and Rest views of the world economy described in chapter 10. 
Another major difference in the focus of this new introduction is the rising insecurity 
in the Middle East and the Ukraine: in the novel subtitled “from fiction to reality”, the action 
starts in Ukraine during the 2nd World War but moves to a competition between China and 
the US, leaving the EU somewhat caught in the middle. The examples from neuroscience in 
Costa (2014) nicely complement their salience in Kahnemann (2011). In addition, awareness 
of the importance of the media and of leadership in crisis is prominent in the Globalization 
and Governance course17.  
Chapters 9 and 10 come from Energy@CPLP workshop, where papers were also 
presented by Manuel Ferreira de Oliveira, CEO of GALP, and Alves da Rocha, an economist 
at the Catholic University of Angola who is foreign member of ACL18. There I emphasize 
the evolution of CPLP from the promotion of “mutual knowledge” in connection with the 
MDGs to rising economic interdependence, especially in energy – thanks to the work carried 
out over the last twelve months by ELO under the chairmanship of GALP and then that of 
CIP, the employers’ association, which has been presented to Portugal’s Strategic Council 
for Open Economy (CEIE).  
The perspective from South Western Europe is consistent with Portugal’s idea of 
Europe, as shaped by the first wave of globalization and the two complementary allegiances 
of its people. The globalization of Europe, noted by Richard Rose (2013, 137), implies that 
“European states are now embedded in an irregular polyhedron with many sides. Each side 
represents a different policy concern of the states involved.” Portugal’s side is bound to be 
determined by its membership in CPLP, and must overcome a European foreign policy “with 
too many voices”. In this connection, the challenges identified by an inter-institutional EU 
project (ESPAS, 2015) as three global revolutions must be kept in mind. In addition to 
geopolitics, social and democratic aspirations interact with economic and technological 
                                                          
17 Costa (2014) will be presented by the author and Rurik Ingram will lecture on Leadership in crisis. LQL is 
mentioned in Renault and Marcelo (2011, 144 note 36). 
18 He was proposed in 2012 by Ilídio do Amaral, former dean of the 7th section (Sociology and other Human 
and Social Sciences) of the humanities class, with explicit support from the 6th. 
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change, challenges for Europe come from a richer and older human race, a more vulnerable 
process of globalization with a fragile multilateralism and a growing nexus between natural 
resources, energy and climate change.  
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Chapter 2  
Letters to Queens 
Jorge Braga de Macedo 
 
The first G-20 summit was held in Washington in December 2008 to deal with the 
financial crisis even though it also sought to preserve the multilateral trade system. There 
were follow up meetings on macroeconomic stimulus packages in London and Pittsburgh, 
where the so called Washington consensus of the 1990s was “pronounced dead” and the IMF 
received a renewed mandate for comparative analysis. After decades when failures of 
coordination within and between advanced countries, even within an increasingly integrated 
EU, were neglected, governments had to face together a financial crisis that their nations 
addressed alone. Actually this paradox in G&G interaction arose within the EZ itself. There 
policy coordination was supposed to be strongest, even before the Lisbon treaty gave a 
formal role to the finance ministers of its member countries (aka eurogroup), alongside those 
of the EU –who were signatories of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Independently of joint 
appearances at the G-20 summits, following enlarged G-7/8 events, developed countries and 
emerging markets realize that they are mutually interdependent even though they rarely 
coordinate their national policy responses, making the “together alone” paradox as global as 
the crisis. 
The trade and financial links between the United States and China, sometimes called 
the G-2, are the most vivid example but the differences in the perception of the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008 by the Queen of England and the President of Brazil are equally striking. 
Queen Elizabeth asked how come everyone missed the signals of the crisis.  During a 
subsequent visit to Brazil of her Prime Minister, President Lula made an equally celebrated 
comment: the crisis originating in rich countries is “a blue-eyed crisis”. There have been 
responses to the question in the form of letters, whereas the comment has been neglected as 
a kind of ethnic joke.  
Nevertheless, the implicit exchange between Queen and President underscores the 
cultural dimension of the “together alone” paradox: no one saw the global crisis coming 
because everyone who could see suppressed a (blue-eyed) crisis. This tendency for “group 
20 
 
 
think” cannot be ignored “in a world that is both highly connected and tribal” (Tett, 2009). 
In any event, the British Academy responded to the Queen’s question on 17/06/09 by 
convening a “Forum” on the crisis. A second “Forum” on the subject was held on 15/12/09, 
and another letter sent on 08/02/10, investigating “financial and economic horizon-scanning 
capabilities”. The second letter was more critical of the UK government precisely because 
“the major challenge is to make institutions and organizational cultures work together. This 
means also getting the right people involved who see the task as a central part of their role 
in government. One can have as much scenario planning as one likes, but if there is no buy 
in from the people who will be taking the decisions in a crisis, then it is probably counter 
productive”. 
Thus the G&G paradox revealed by the global crisis is rooted in “group think” within 
and between countries. In spite of peer review mechanisms at the OECD and the EU, and of 
international governance innovation such as the “global partnership for development” (and 
the seven other MDGs), not enough attention was paid to common problems among 
advanced countries, including financial regulation and supervision in the face of rising asset 
prices. Increased trade in goods, services and assets led to rising global imbalances between 
the US and emerging markets with currencies pegged to the dollar, especially China. The 
resulting volatility in prices of oil and staples had severe implications for poverty alleviation 
and food security, making the seven quantified MDGs impossible to reach in 2015.  
The argument embeds the letters to the Queen into a renewed interest in methodology 
which goes beyond recurrent calls for interdisciplinary research - as long as this research 
does not disturb the usual “economists tribes”, a point that comes across more clearly in the 
second letter. Noting failures of cooperation within and between countries, a perspective 
based on G&G interaction to the “together alone” paradox finds “mutual knowledge” 
essential for the global partnership on development and experiences of culture-based 
multilateralism. Europe is of course a prime example of regional governance where peer 
pressure stems from explicit commitments, yet it has become the epicenter of the crisis. 
Multilateral surveillance mechanisms still fail the mutual accountability test contained in the 
Monterey declaration of February 2002 which was supposed to replace the Washington 
consensus and the G20 did not bring out coalitions where peer pressure is for action, not for 
inaction. 
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1. “Economic Culture Wars” Revisited 
If the G20 enhances the multilateral surveillance framework of the IMF in the 
direction of mutual accountability, coalitions among nations and regions will have beneficial 
consequences for the global common good and may reflect positively on the role of 
economists in public life. Truth be told, the only methodological debate I remember, in part 
because I used it in my introductory macro course at NOVASBE, happened in Slate 
Magazine between Krugman (1996) and Galbraith (1996). One year after the crisis broke, 
the field was full of controversy: on the day the Nobel prize in economics was announced, 
testifying that economics as a social science deals with institutional and governance issues, 
Alan Beattie (2009) wrote a “global insight” about the bickering between freshwater (e.g. 
Chicago) and saltwater (e.g. MIT) economists. The profession needs humility he concluded, 
adding “anyone who thinks otherwise is an idiot.” Such “tribal” answers from salt or 
freshwater economists continue while crises proceed. 
A cartoon by Studemann and Thatcher (2009) used a Wall Street version of Voltaire’s 
Candide to mock rational expectations. Speaking at the Perimeter Institute on Theoretical 
Physics in Waterloo, Ontario, the other end of the communications spectrum, Andrew Lo 
(2009) argued that both tribes share what he calls “physics envy” and favors organic 
analogies. These would seem to be more appropriate to model the adaptive nature of 
individual and collective behavior but have remained far from the mainstream. 
The quote from Krugman (2009b) follows: "Few economists saw our current crisis 
coming, but this predictive failure was the least of the field’s problems. More important was 
the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market 
economy... the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook 
beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth ... economists fell back in love 
with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect 
markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations ... Unfortunately, this romanticized and 
sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go 
wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to 
bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of 
markets – especially financial markets – that can cause the economy’s operating system o 
undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t 
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believe in regulation. ... When it comes to the all-too-human problem of recessions and 
depressions, economists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution of assuming that 
everyone is rational and markets work perfectly." 
James Galbraith (2010) begins with another quote from the same piece: “Of course, 
there were exceptions to these trends: a few economists challenged the assumption of rational 
behavior, questioned the belief that financial markets can be trusted and pointed to the long 
history of financial crises that had devastating economic consequences. But they were 
swimming against the tide, unable to make much headway against a pervasive and, in 
retrospect, foolish complacency” and takes issue with him for not naming the exceptions: 
“Apart from one other half-sentence, and three passing mentions of one person, it’s the only 
discussion—the one mention in the entire essay— of those economists who got it right. They 
are not named. Their work is not cited. Their story remains untold. Despite having been right 
on the greatest economic question of a generation—they are unpersons in the tale”. He goes 
on to compare the distinction between saltwater and freshwater economists to Tweedledum 
and Tweedledee and concludes: “This remains the essential problem. As I have 
documented—and only in part— there is a considerable, rich, promising body of economics, 
theory and evidence, entirely suited to the study of the real economy and its enormous 
problems. This work is significant in ways in which the entire corpus of mainstream 
economics—including recent fashions like the new “behavioral economics”— simply is not. 
But where is it inside the economics profession? Essentially, nowhere. It is therefore 
pointless to continue with conversations centered on the conventional economics. The urgent 
need is instead to expand the academic space and the public visibility of ongoing work that 
is of actual value when faced with the many deep problems of economic life in our time. It 
is to make possible careers in those areas, and for people with those perspectives, that have 
been proven worthy by events. This is—obviously—not a matter to be entrusted to the 
economics departments themselves. It is an imperative, instead, for university 
administrators, for funding agencies, for foundations, and for students and perhaps their 
parents. The point is not to argue endlessly with Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The point is 
to move past them toward the garden that must be out there, that in fact is out there, 
somewhere” (emphasis in original). 
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While revisiting these economic culture wars helped deconstruct the letters to Queen 
Elizabeth, the development dimension remains as implicit as the hypothetical exchange with 
President Lula mentioned at the outset. The “silo curse” brings out historical comparisons 
but also a broader geographical domain, beyond the “blue-eyed” or Western world. In other 
words, the dangers of “group think”, apparent before this crisis, have not been analyzed in 
connection with global, or even regional, governance. In December 2006, Krugman (2009a) 
spoke in Lisbon of “incestuous amplification” and “suppression” in connection with 
resistance to social security reform in the US. He elaborated on the idea at his TriDoc and 
since then in his blog of January 29, 2013 “Incestuous Amplification, Economics Edition” 
and “Incestuous Amplification, Further Illustrated”. 
 
2. Nine points and then three more in the letters to Queen Elizabeth 
Deconstructing the letters to Queen Elizabeth, the first contains nine points and the 
second three detailed in my contribution to Renaud and Marcelo (2011, 101-105), as 
summarized in the following table. 
1. Ferocity not foreseen, powers not available 
2. Imbalances and risk neglected 
3. Global savings glut and easy borrowing 
4. Wishful thinking combined with hubris about risk 
5. Politicians believed bankers were engineers 
6. Feel good factor led to delusion 
7. Lax regulation: don’t do bubbles after dot.com 
8. Psychology of herding and no single authority 
9. Forecasting failure: never again? 
10. Horizon-scanning is distinct from forecasting. 
11. Culture and institutions 
12. Government did not help 
 
The first letter to Queen Elizabeth focuses on the advanced economies (especially US 
and UK) and only mentions China and India in connection with the “global savings glut” in 
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point 3. Point 5 (seeing bankers as engineers) pertains more broadly to “advanced 
economies” and leads to the ‘feel-good factor’ there as creating a “psychology of denial” 
(point 6). The “pressure for more lax regulation” (point 7) was also greatest in US and UK 
since “some countries did raise interest rates” (point 7a) but the “psychology of herding” 
(point 8) fed the benign neglect about rising imbalances in the US balance of payments. The 
view of the US and China as a pseudo monetary union reinforced the complacency about 
systemic risks (point 9). The parallel with the 1920s - when residential mortgage rose from 
10% of household net wealth to 29% - is striking. The recession which began end 2007 is 
about half of the Great Depression in the US - but worldwide it was the same at the March 
2009 trough. The three points from the second letter underscore the “together alone” paradox 
within a single government more than the first letter but still neglect the international 
dimension of G&G interaction. 
 
3. Culture and development goals 
The best chance of avoiding the need to repeat the LSE question lies in quickening 
the sensitivities and states of mind of those charged with trying to anticipate what economic 
and financial shocks may occur in future. This can only happen where there is an 
environment which provides sufficient criticism of assumptions and is open to considering 
a wide range of possibilities. The hierarchical structures and histories of our many 
organizations provide a major challenge to making this work effectively. Hence the need for 
a combination of cultural and institutional reform. 
Developed countries stand to gain from contributing, bilaterally and multilaterally, 
to policies that turn developing countries into more open economies, better integrated in the 
world economy. But globalization can only bring lasting benefits if the governance response 
is appropriate and diverse G&G interactions make it harder to find what such response might 
be. In particular, trust between local and foreign partners is even more crucial in developing 
countries, where most of the population is in a situation of absolute poverty and the state 
depends on external assistance because it is virtually devoid of a working tax administration. 
Even in the absence of armed conflict in the country or surrounding region, trust between all 
the partners and entities that finance development must rest on MDGs and on policies that 
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sustain economic growth. The prerequisite of institutional change required by such policies 
confirms the importance of cultural factors. 
Culture affects such personal traits as honesty, thrift, willingness to work hard and 
openness to strangers, in one word, trust. The example that is very clear here is the role of 
the family. Institutions such as the family are very different in different parts of the world 
and as mentioned below this has a well defined impact on economic development. A related 
example is sharing, which is part of Africa's cultural inheritance. Along these lines, the 
Monterrey declaration favors public-private partnerships for development. 
The religious dimension of culture shows a complex pattern of interaction, where the 
effect depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging: for given church attendance 
(belonging), increases in some religious beliefs – notably heaven, hell and an afterlife – tend 
to increase economic growth. For given beliefs, on the other hand, increases in church 
attendance tend to reduce economic growth. The concern with morality and the theological 
foundation of culture has increased in the context of the global economic crisis, where the 
love of truth has been abandoned in favor of a crude materialism. 
In his Encyclical letter Caritas in veritate - in the tradition of St Thomas Aquinas, 
Frédéric Bastiat, Willem Roepke and even Friedrich von Hayek according to Rev Robert 
Sirico (2009) - Benedict XVI urges that this crisis becomes “an opportunity for discernment, 
in which to shape a new vision for the future” and attributes the crisis itself to badly managed 
and largely speculative financial dealing but he resists the current fashion of blaming all 
existing world problems on the market economy. There are two practical implications of 
“love in truth”. First: Moral priorities of generosity go beyond rights and duties. Second: The 
common good extends the good of individuals who live in society. The worldwide diffusion 
of prosperity should not be held up by projects that are protectionist: more not less trade is 
needed. Institutional cooperation is needed outside the usual players: the defense of 
multilateralism goes hand in hand with the realization that structural insecurity generates anti 
productive attitudes wasteful of human resources. Thus human costs always include 
economic costs and economic dysfunctions always involve human costs.  
Rising income divergence within and between countries was once an inheritance of 
import-substituting industrialization and central planning but subsequent attempts at 
promoting convergence by raising the growth rate of poor countries over that of rich ones 
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have rarely been sustained. A caveat to usual convergence measures is the exclusive focus 
on GDP growth, which is criticized by Joe Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean- Paul Fitoussi in 
the 2009 report of the “Happiness Commission”. Yet there is not a unique factor behind the 
poverty of nations. Poor countries are "slightly" disadvantaged in each one of the factors 
behind prosperity. But the combination of these slight weaknesses results in huge income 
gaps. This is why Daniel Cohen (2006) claims that more rather than less globalization would 
make positive G&G interactions more widespread. Yet, the difficulties in measurement and 
interpretation of changes in cultural and governance variables should be kept in mind. For 
example, many of the available governance indicators are very arbitrary, in part because 
changes in these indicators are not easy to interpret. In addition to cultural diversity, then, 
unavailability of data and inadequate analysis thereof are reasons for available indicators to 
damage peer pressure instead of promoting it. In any event, many examples of vicious and 
virtuous cycles quoted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) are clear cut. 
Before the crisis, the world was on track for halving poverty by 2015 (with a 1990 
benchmark). Between 2000 and 2005: 120 million people out of poverty; 2 million lives 
saved through reduced child mortality; 30 million additional 6-12 children going to school; 
30 million additional families having access to drinking water; Boys and girls in equal 
numbers in primary school. Yet, global poverty progress was largely due to rapid growth in 
giant Asian countries: China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Most developing countries were 
projected not to meet most MDGs: although necessary, growth alone cannot do the job. 
Progress on MDGs is shaped by the global economic environment, by domestic policies and, 
for the poorest countries, how much and how well aid is delivered and used. Each one of 
these three factors looks worse with the global crisis. Tackling chronic poverty will remain 
a priority after 2015: MDG achievements will need to be sustained. This implies the need to 
consider MDGs as part of an overall sustainable development strategy. 
Pro-poor growth illustrates a positive G&G interaction, whereas negative interaction 
hurts growth and development. Reaching the eight MDGs in 2015 presupposes sustained 
economic growth in addition to better governance and more aid, as recommended at the 
Monterrey Conference. The 8th goal (to develop a global partnership for development) 
reflects disappointment with the performance of developing countries which seemed to 
follow the policy recommendations of the Washington consensus. As governance 
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improvements were not commensurate with the challenges of globalization, especially in 
what concerns financial markets, some developing countries interrupted the long term 
convergence process even before the global crisis struck. 
Trust between social and economic partners, an environment favorable to business 
development, and better co-ordination between development finance institutions may all 
contribute to positive governance responses. As such, they also help translate the MDGs into 
national and global policy proposals as required by the eighth goal, which features targets 
for aid, trade and debt relief. In this context, public-private partnerships become an important 
instrument in creating an environment favorable to the normal functioning of business and 
the attraction of investment, an essential element in generating employment and creating 
wealth. To the extent that they broaden the knowledge base for policy dialogue between 
business and the public sector (points 24 and 25 of the Monterrey Declaration), public-
private partnerships help to define the common good and the best ways to bring it about in 
each country. This broadening of the knowledge base will in turn promote the adaptive 
capacity of society as a whole, a key to fast growth. The better organized and prepared is the 
private sector, the more easily it can take coherent positions and contribute positively to 
discussions and to decision taking. Similarly, a local private sector that is well-organized and 
technically competent can more easily be an effective partner to foreign investors, avoiding 
foreign capture of all good investment opportunities. The provision of technical assistance 
in the context of a public-private partnership can thus help private sector associations to 
mature or, at very least, to point out the major shortcomings and indicate where assistance 
could most profitably be applied. 
 
4. Wrong question? 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, LQL was promoted by CG&G and has 
been featured in some of the graduate courses at NOVASBE. It was also discussed during 
Paul Krugman’s visit to ACL on 24/02/12. A few days later, as he was being awarded his 
three honorary doctorates, I introduced him as a “progressist pessimist of the world 
economy”. True to form, he concluded his lecture with a severe indictment of the profession: 
“In normal times, when things are going pretty well, the world can function reasonably well 
without professional economic advice. It’s in times of crisis, when practical experience 
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suddenly proves useless and events are beyond anyone’s normal experience, that we need 
professors with their models to light the path forward. And when the moment came, we 
failed”. Silva Lopes, who, as governor of the Central Bank, was responsible for Krugman’s 
mission to Portugal in 1976, commented on the doctoral lecture and concluded with an 
equally dire prediction followed by a kind of silver lining: “I would very much like to see in 
the near future the weakening of the influence not only of freshwater economists but also of 
their conservative European followers. But I fear that this will not happen until we find 
ourselves in a more calamitous situation than at present. My only hope is that the ideas of 
Paul Krugman will soon have more influence in policy makers than at present seems to be 
the case”. 
In Chapter 6, RM quotes the Hayek vs. Keynes Boom and Bust rap anthem used in 
my principles of macroeconomics course and cautions against any pretension about what is 
the best model of economic development as I cannot identify the winner of ‘the fight of the 
century’. Nevertheless, he agrees with the contributions by RVM and JFS in Chapters 3 and 
5 respectively. Before noting “the absolute need to internalize the concept that no system can 
maintain perpetual expansion/growth” and acknowledging not a mere replacement of 
dominant powers but the emergence of a "second world" (Parag Khana), he quotes Flores 
claim in Chapter 4 that the feedbacks from each side to the other will not contribute to 
“peaceful and constructive approaches”. 
In response to RM, RVM suggested that the problem is not the crisis itself, but the 
coupling between finance on one side and productive economic activity on the other as 
described in Chapter 3 below. In that connection, he emphasized the importance of the timing 
of intervention from the regulators. 
As described in Macedo (2013b), Krugman mentioned evolutionary economics in the 
discussion of LQL, to the effect that organisms’ evolution occurs locally and takes place 
over time, maximizing reproductive success, often taking advantages from crises in 
detriment of equilibria. If economics is done with the right spirit, some biological models 
cannot be applied. Some aspects in economics can be modeled by physics so that the Queen’s 
question is the wrong question. In addition, financial crises are not new, they happen all the 
time and are recognizable. This time is different, but it is never different. At the surface it 
looks different, but on the basis there is always the same pattern. While this time more 
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documentation is available from the past, people have a short memory regarding crises. In 
the immediate times people will save, but then they will forget and so will the regulators. 
People’s perception of bank functions has been misjudged. Lots of banks and products were 
unsupervised and unguaranteed. The usefulness of parallels between the biological world 
and the “human world” should therefore be questioned. For Krugman, Greece suffered a 
natural catastrophy and this raises the question of whether there would be a biological model 
to solve the crisis. 
Silva Lopes argued that behavioral economics is a growing field from which we have 
more to learn than from biology. Sociology and history can give more support to understand 
and apply to crises: different organisms; different behavior. The way to solve a crisis in 
Germany can hardly be successfully applied to Portugal, due to personality differences. Pinto 
Barbosa read a text reproduced in Macedo et al. (2013b) and asked whether there was some 
original misdiagnosis about the most relevant fragilities that of the EZ and, if so, might have 
this possibly contributed to a somewhat inadequate design of a proper monetary framework? 
Krugman replied that this crisis was an asymmetric shock story because Europe is almost a 
closed system. 
Luís Goulão valued the contribution of psychology, psychiatry and neurology to 
understand the crisis, framing biology of thinking-organisms. Fear prevented us from seeing 
the crisis and difficulties in facing errors lead to more errors. Different geopolitical 
references induce different information perceptions. Likewise, distinct average life 
expectancy thrive different decisions and will to take risks. Ana Melo added that there are 
two levels of regulation in a cell - locally and globally. There is also an enormous redundancy 
of regulation mechanisms to overcome cell malfunctioning. Moreover, the efficiency of 
biological regulation relies on huge networking between every pathway of the system. Only 
this ensures life as a tightly regulated and thus successful process. RM added that we have 
to find accurately our place in the system. There is a difference between individual and 
collective behavior. Time scale is critical when applying biological models to behavioral 
ones. Man has social sciences, nature does not. 
Helena Garrido came back to the issue of relating biological models to finance 
markets: nowadays economy is not the same as a couple of years ago. Can we apply the same 
models? At this point I had to bring in another Princeton Nobel prize in Economics, Daniel 
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Kahnemann who argues that we have two minds - a shallow and a slow and lazy. Since the 
second is lazy we tend to use too much of the first, which limits rationality. Therefore, it is 
easier to see the balances on others than in ourselves.  
The diversity of CPLP perspectives could contribute to put multidisciplinary work in 
the agenda and to trigger public debate by academies and research universities. “Portuguese-
speaking economists might transcend the silo curse in a world that is both highly connected 
and tribal”. 
Krugman doubted again that the question of Queen Elizabeth could trigger a 
multidisciplinary debate on the global financial crisis or indeed be tackled from a biological 
approach. As he would say in his lecture and has repeated many times since: “No economic 
theory can perform the feats its users have come to expect of it. (…) Too much of what 
happens in an economy depends on what people expect to happen.” Through multiple 
perspectives, insights, networking and capacity of transmission between groups, a new 
attitude to face and overcome crises arises. 
 
5. CPLP and mutual knowledge  
Portugal and Brazil, five AU members (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe) and East-Timor make up CPLP, with headquarters in 
Lisbon and under Portuguese presidency of its council in 2008-2010. Like Portugal as a 
tourist destination in the early 1970s, CPLP remains a “well kept secret” of culture-based 
multilateralism: “the mutual friendship among members” mentioned in the treaty is not 
enough to build a global partnership for development from the perspective of the group, what 
is called “global lusophonia” to underline that the concern goes beyond CPLP members. 
The contribution of Brazil was decisive in the creation of CPLP in 1996, the joint 
presidency of the secretariat and of the council in 2003/2004, and the creation of Business 
Council with a secretariat at ELO - Portuguese Association for Economic Development and 
Cooperation. The two more advanced members feared that an economic dimension would 
trigger expectations of larger development assistance towards PALOP (and Timor since 
2000). Yet the Herfindahl number equivalent is 1,4 - the same as for NAFTA – and GDP 
shares of the four larger countries were never smaller than 99.75%. The Bissau declaration 
aims at monitoring progress with respect to reaching MDGs. It emphasizes that the 
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underlying philosophy is one of “genuine partnership for development”, based on “mutual 
knowledge”, an original concept which suggests governance innovation. 
This was a first contribution to inserting CPLP in the quest for “mutual knowledge”. 
The gains from joint actions with systemically significant emerging markets, such as India 
or South Africa, can be even greater if these actions enhance the South-South cooperation 
dimension without diluting the common cultural allegiance. In this regard the attendance at 
the first Ministerial Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and 
Portuguese-Speaking Countries in Macau in 2003 provided a good precedent for greater 
visibility of work carried out under OECD auspices. The presentation of OECD work 
convinced the national authorities present, especially the host country, that peer review 
mechanisms help improve the governance response to globalization and signal the rising 
financial reputation of emerging markets, thereby accelerating reforms and promoting the 
agenda of South-South co-operation. 
In accordance with a decision taken at the Maputo Summit in July 2000, the first 
CPLP Business Forum was held in Lisbon in June 2002 and decided to set up a Business 
Council, whose objectives were listed at the Brasilia Summit in July 2002. They were: (i)to 
enhance capacity building of business associations in member countries as well as to promote 
cooperation between them; (ii) to create a business network in the regions where lusophone 
enterprises operate; (iii) to encourage strategic partnerships; (iv) to promote innovative 
financing methods, and (v) to support local private sectors in the public-private dialogue. 
Progress towards meeting these objectives was reviewed at the second Business Forum, held 
in Fortaleza, Brazil in June 2003 after the Brazil-Africa Forum. At the Coimbra Ministerial 
meeting, the message was that public-private partnerships have improved governance and 
mutual understanding between public and private partners. 
Facilitating North-South-South cooperation also provides a European identity in 
development co-operation which has been lacking even though the EU (including the 
Commission and member states) is the largest donor. Greater North-South-South partnership 
may be easier in areas where mutual knowledge is greater. CGIAR, already mentioned in the 
previous chapter, is the international body that sparked the “green revolution” in crop yields 
during the 1960s and 1970s which alleviated poverty throughout Asia. Due to a lack of 
support for implementation in Africa, the “green revolution” did not benefit the poor there. 
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Symbolically, the first meeting of the CGIAR in Africa announced a major reform, 
implemented throughout 2009. 
One reason why North-South-South co-operation may be the way to go is that 
questions arise about the effect of cultural and linguistic proximity on the effectiveness of 
peer pressure. The Commonwealth of Nations, based in London, and the Organisation 
Internationale de la Francophonie, based in Paris, are two strictly North-South entities, with 
some common members such as Canada and Mozambique. On the contrary, the Ibero-
American Secretariat (SEGIB), based in Madrid, and especially CPLP are rather North-
South-South, with common members Portugal and Brazil. The latter two are easier to 
recognize because their diversity precludes the association of the language with the particular 
governance model of the former colonial power: there is no expectation that membership 
will bring about economic and political convergence. In addition, the geographical 
dispersion of CPLP is far greater than in the other three entities, and, after the graduation of 
Cape Verde to middle income country status, there are still five less developed countries. 
The overwhelming weight of Brazil and the difference in bilateral relations with India 
or China between Portugal and the UK, France or even Spain, a member of the G20, goes in 
the same direction. As RF emphasizes, CPLP is closer to ASEAN or the BRICS in the sense 
that the diversity of every member is easier to recognize. On the other side, this extreme 
diversity makes it imperative to enhance the relations between the members and their sub 
regional organizations, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (East Timor), 
the Community of Central African States (São Tomé e Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea), the 
Economic Community of West African States (Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau), the EU 
(Portugal), Mercosul (Brazil) and the Southern African Development Community (Angola 
and Mozambique). Yet progress has slowed at the political and economic level as crises 
unfold on both sides of the North Atlantic and the CPLP secretariat, its Business 
Confederation and the Macao Forum did not manage to explore the complementary among 
members, let alone their surrounding economic areas – as was mentioned at the outset of this 
edition. 
Concluding with Kahnemann (2011), it is easier to see the balances on others than in 
ourselves. In a world that is both highly connected and tribal, Portuguese-speaking 
economists might not be better able to transcend the silo curse than their English-speaking 
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colleagues and an interdisciplinary forum could limit interaction and bring out a hollow 
consensus. Appealing to LQL was thus seen as a natural imitation of the British Academy, 
with the two differences pointed out at the outset: going beyond English and social sciences. 
Recalling Poe’s Descent from the introduction, there may indeed be a lesson for the popular 
perception of economists following the global crisis. The brother who abandoned ship and 
survived showed leadership in crisis (Parker, 2013). 
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Chapter 3 
Mathematics and the subprime crisis:  Lessons for the next stages 
Rui Vilela Mendes 
 
1. The financial crisis that started in 2007 
Talking at a meeting in January 2011, Nout Wellink, the chairman of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, pointed out the following as the main causes of the 
crisis: 
 
1. The financial crisis was triggered primarily by excess global liquidity, too much 
leverage, too little capital of insufficient quality and in adequate liquidity buffers; 
2. It was made worse by a procyclical deleveraging process and the 
interconnectedness among systemically important financial institutions that were considered 
too-big-to-fail; 
3. A number of other factors also played a major role. These include major short 
comings in risk management, corporate governance, market transparency, compensation 
practices and the quality of supervision. Risk management and supervision failed due to an 
overly narrow, firm-specific focus and an insufficient understanding of how broader system-
wide risks could play out under stress. 
 
2. Financial crisis: Was the mathematics to blame? 
Many people thought so: some titles and cartoons 
 
Crise financière: la faute aux mathématiques? (Le Monde) 
Subprime crisis: Did rocket scientists destroy world markets? (France 24) 
Il faut démissioner Nicole El Karaoui (blogbosteur.kaywa.com) 
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However, the mathematics was there, but nobody was paying attention, because it 
was profitable to do so, in the short term. 
Three examples: 
1 – Risk measures 
2 – The multiplicative effect (or sensitive dependence on initial conditions) 
3 – Statistical arbitrage 
 
a) Risk measures, penalty terms and the subprime 
First example: Risk measures and penalty terms 
Theorem for convex measures (Föllmer and Schied) 
Let M be set of all probability measures on Ω (finite) ρ is a convex risk measure if there is a 
penalty function α : M →(─ ∞,∞] 
 
 
 
ρ (X) = sup (EQ  [–X ] – α (Q)) 
QЄP 
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The sup being taken over all possible scenarios Q and α is convex lower semi 
continuous and α (Q) ≥ – ρ (0) (see http://label2.ist.utl.pt/vilela/Cursos/Risk.pdf) 
- In a convex risk measure (not VaR!), the first term represents the maximal expected 
loss in the scenario Q and α (Q) accounts for the probability of the scenario.  
- Whereas the calculation of EQ [–X] is a simple exercise in stochastic analysis, 
estimation of α (Q) involves many factors which are frequently not taken into account. For 
example if the historical data that is being used does not contain unfavorable events it is 
tempting (or profitable) to say that melt downs are quite improbable. 
 
b) Was the crisis predictable? 
Intrigued why the experts of the rating agencies had rated AAA the "toxic" products 
and had not predicted the crisis, 3 economists of the Federal Reserve of Atlanta, made an 
extensive analysis of their reports of the years before the crisis: 
Most experts reported that a small fall in the price of the houses would lead to disaster, 
but assigned a small (penalty) probability to that event [8]. 
In the Atlanta paper, instead of the language of convex measures, the authors consider 
the probability of foreclosures decomposed in to 
 


=




 
 


 being the sensivity of foreclosures to price (HPA) and  

	
 the time variation of the price 
of houses. Their conclusion was that the estimation of 


 was correct but not of 

	
 (this is 
equivalent to the effect of the penalty term)  
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Name Scenario Probability 
1) Aggressive 11% HPA over life of the pool 15% 
2) [No name] 8%  HPA over life of the pool 15% 
3) Base HPA slows to 5% by year-end 2005 50% 
4) Pessimistic 0% HPA for the next 3 years, 5% thereafter 15% 
5) Meltdown -5% for the next 3 years, 5% thereafter 5% 
 
It should have been clear after 2001 that the probability of a downturn was high. 
In addition, how could inflation-adjusted prices continue to rise when real incomes of 
most Americans, especially at the bottom, continued to fall? 
A small value was assigned to the penalty term. Why? 
- Conflict of interests: The SEC recognition of the main 4NRSRO's agencies (Fitch, 
Moody's, S&P and Dominion) together with the recommendations of Basel II, put them in 
the center of the financial world. However their clients are exactly the creators of the 
securities. If one agency does not provide favorable reports, look elsewhere. 
- A recent proof: In February 2011, Redwood Trust put in the market the second (since 
the crisis) mortgage-based private-label security in the USA. Redwood asked both Fitch and 
Moody's for ratings, but only published Fitch's report. Later on, perhaps to assert its 
credibility, Moody's published its report which was quite negative. 
- If the client is the buyer of the securities, a conflict of interest of opposite sign may 
also occur. Are cent proposal is the creation of government-sponsored clearing agencies. Will 
it ever work? 
- By the way, after their deplorable performance in the subprime, the rating agencies 
have now become great experts of the "sovereign debt". Why? To serve their clients, the 
lenders, of course. 
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The evidence against a small penalty term: The housing bubble 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) The multiplicative effect: The mathematics of sensitive dependence 
The subprime was worth less than 5% of the American market. However: 
 
 
 
The mathematics of sensitive dependence: 
- As the subprime default rates increased the prices of the mortgage securities 
dropped. 
- The involved banks and other institutions had to write off billions in asset values, 
seek large capital infusions and drastically reduce lending. 
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- Reduced lending by banks affects all corporations even those not involved in the 
mortgage market because of the equity-to-debt ratio and operations financing. 
- Hedge funds losing money in the subprime market started selling positions in other 
markets. Stocks dropped 
In this way a sector that is less than 5% of the American market originated a global 
crisis.  
Here again the mathematics is well-known. It is not stochastic analysis but the 
mathematics of non-linear dynamics. 
 
d) "The world largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud" 
Even when the mathematics is simple people does not want to pay attention. Why? 
- The 1999 Markopoulos exposition to the SEC and his letter in 2005 about Bernard 
Madoff. 
- From statistical arbitrage mathematics it was evident that Madoff could not generate 
the stable 12% average annual return unless he was using insider-trading or it was a Ponzi 
scheme. 
- Although some large brokerage institutions (Goldman Sachs, for example) stayed 
away from any deals with Madoff, he continued to attract a lot of investment in Europe and 
the USA. Even in a Ponzi scheme the first investors (or those that think they are special) hope 
to make a profit. The SEC had no timely action. 
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3. Regulation and innovation 
A lack of market regulation has also been blamed  
 
 
- Banks, contrary to other financial institutions (shadow banking), are subjected to 
supervision and regulation: 1988 BIS Accord (Basel I), 1996 Amendment to BIS Accord, 
1999 Basel II, now Basel III and Solvency II. 
-That however did not discouraged them (or even encouraged them) to find clever 
ways to write-off risks from their balance books. 
- Conclusion: No amount of regulation will prevent innovation designed to evade it. 
Therefore regulation should be as dynamic as the innovation. Is this possible or desirable? 
- The differences between the Basel III and Solvency II rules have already started to 
be explored by the insurance companies, although these rules will not become mandatory 
before 2013 and 2016. Hence the mismatch of time scales between regulation and 
innovations. 
What is the mathematics? It is the same mathematics that is used by mathematical 
biologists to describe, for example, the adaptation of microorganisms to antibiotics. 
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4. The messages 
- For the market practitioners: The mathematics is there. It is only a question of paying 
attention (but perhaps it is more profitable, in the short term, not to pay attention). 
- For the mathematicians: To understand the economic environment, there is more 
than stochastic analysis and derivative pricing. 
 
5. A final comment: The coupling question 
As pointed out sometime a go by Olivier Blanchard [9] the losses in the subprime 
loans and securities, a relatively small sector of the US economy, will have a loss impact in 
the world GDP of at least twenty times more, not to speak of the much larger impact on the 
world stock market capitalization. This shows the very serious nonlinear coupling of the 
financial instruments among themselves and with the overall economy. 
The financial sector, an otherwise useful device for making capital savings available 
for investment, has become an independent world by itself with rules and practices 
sometimes far removed from the realities of the productive economy. Think for example of 
the volume of oil derivatives traded every day and compare it with the expected production 
on the next ten years. 
Some of the imaginative instruments that are created in the financial world are not 
even used for its original purpose. For example the pooling of mortgages in MBS's, an 
adequate instrument of risk transfer, defeat their own purpose when, for reasons of short time 
profit, are kept on SIV's. All this is natural to occur, because human ambition is driving the 
machine and the sector being highly dynamic and innovative is not fully understood by all 
players. Therefore financial crisis and bubbles are bound to occur and it is unlikely that static 
regulations will ever avoid them. Many regulations were already in place, which did not 
control the dot-com bubble or the sub-prime bubble and not probably the next shale-gas 
bubble. 
The strong coupling of the finance world with the world GDP, what is sometimes 
called the financerization of the economy is the real problem, not crisis which are bound to 
occur as in any dynamic game. From a useful instrument of the economy, the finance sector 
became its master. To regulate it is probably not the right approach. To weaken the coupling 
between the finance world and the “real economy” would be perhaps better. Is it possible? 
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Chapter 4 
While the crisis proceeds: A world redistribution of economic power? 
Renato G. Flôres Jr. 
 
0. Prologue1. 
“Your Majesty, 
 
The fall of the Constantinople market had indeed dramatic consequences on all trade 
and financial flows and institutions. 
Those Byzantine traders had for sure overdone. While they focused on the internal 
logic of the myriad of products they traded and discussed, including rather exotic options on 
the timing of the Holy Trinity, they forgot the global picture, overlooking the several and 
intertwined derivations of their multiple actions. 
We apologize for the pun, but the Byzantine rulers were lost in a Byzantine mesh of 
regulations and bureaucracy whose global view nobody held any more. 
NINJA2 borrowers, from the seven oceans, were menacing the security of the city 
markets since long. The Rumeli junk bonds – traded also by the Greeks (again?), under the 
name of Laimokopias bonds – were a clear threat. Hedging strategies were used, but in 
exactly the opposite way! making more pervasive the entrances to the city markets. The 
Theodosian Walls Hedge Fund, completely exposed to attacks, was particularly vulnerable. 
But the authorities kept saying they were the safest guardians of internal stability! 
Eventually, those turbaned NINJA, originating from the Anatolian slums, where they 
lived below the Holy Eastern Empire Poverty Line, made it. What collapsed first? The 
Theodosian Walls, of course. This young man Mehmet II, a former head of a “Janissaries” 
NGO (now, sheer establishment) is really competent. 
The shock waves due to the fall brought fear and disruption to all realms. 
                                                          
1 For the “letter to the Queen” in the Prologue, I‟ve freely used information in the classic account by the late 
Sir James C. S. Runciman (Steven Runciman), distinguished polyglot and medievalist, The Fall of 
Constantinople 1453, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1965. The number of scholarly 
publications dealing partially or entirely with this main event, at the crossroads of a new era, is simply huge. 
Many encompass histories of the Byzantine or Ottoman Empires, more than a few are outstanding. I personally 
suggest as a further introduction to the theme, in a broader panorama, another near classic: Norwich, J. J. 1997. 
A Short History of Bizancium. New York: Vintage Books. 
2 NINJA = Non Imperial Nomad Johns Around. 
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Several meetings of different K-X3groups were held in the most pleasant castles overlooking 
our greener fiefs, trying to find new regulations to avert the tide of disaster. 
Beyond the kings themselves, the imposing delegations comprised numerous wise 
and fat dignitaries, not to mention the cook himself and, at least, half a dozen jokers. Funnily 
enough, many times the king played a dual role, acting also as a joker. 
No really new idea emerged, beyond using the cereals tax (extracted in great part from 
the poorer farmers) to rescue those guilds considered “too big to fail”, and a few powerful or 
trendy craftsmen who supplied the Western and Eastern courts as well. 
Whenever discussion touched a more reasonable use of the imperial coffers and vaults 
of precious stones, the meeting was adjourned for the festivities offered by the castle owner. 
In spite of the dire situation, these were extremely merry, as shown by the few icons depicting 
some of them: big smiles systematically pervade all royal faces. 
At every new gathering, enthusiasm decreased; from now and then, a little and 
nervous king promised to revamp the whole agenda. 
The solution, Your Highness, came neither from new regulations, nor from talkative 
masters, but from a taciturn, curious people who lived in a secondary market in the tip of the 
Atlantic European coast. They kept looking at the sea for long periods, and enjoyed climbing 
down perilous cliffs for a quick jump into its waters. 
But they changed completely the narrative of the crisis, by creating a new grammar 
and a new syntax. Indeed, an old order and a great Empire had collapsed, and only innovation 
could have rescued us. 
Suddenly, those without their products and instruments became outdated. They found 
new ways to invigorate business, markets were completed and stock markets bloomed in 
China, India and in odd tropical lands where everybody, with Your pardon, works and dances 
stark naked! 
Though the narrative was different, the themes and goals were pretty the same: solid 
fixed income instruments, highly rewarding risky ventures. 
Undoubtedly, a tremendous shift in the balance of power took place, and new voices 
are asserting themselves. 
Many want to revive one of the merriest K-X, also known as the Holy League. 
                                                          
3 Your Highness, the X stands for the number of kingdoms (K) involved in each group. This notation has become 
very fancy. 
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That bloke Mehmet now calls Constantinople by another name, used by his turbaned 
fellows (it sounds like “Eashtanbool”). He promised to keep the Central Soul’s Bank of 
Hagya Sofia, to please the Christian traders, though Muslim practices will be introduced 
there. One (qualitative) forecaster even said that, one day, those people will build a fabulous 
mosque, all in splendid blue tiles.  
Tensions are mounting everywhere, including (one more time!) in the Greek coast. 
New Italian and German hedge funds and modern banks are blooming, but some say their 
position is shaky. 
We are afraid everything will start over soon.” 
 
Imagine Queen Elisabeth II, after having summoned two bright economists of the 
kingdom to explain to her the recent crisis, receiving a few days later the above letter. 
At a first glance, She must have thought that Her two earnest subjects, overwhelmed 
by the responsibility upon their shoulders, went to one of those nice and joyful pubs of the 
City to collect real data. In the course of the enquiries, more relaxed and inspired – and 
perhaps a bit tipsy –, both had produced such a non-sense. 
However, being a fast and bright mind, the Queen, on second thoughts, might ask 
Herself whether perhaps there wasn’t something in it. Maybe it was – as in the cabalistic 
writings – a disguised way to convey some truths, a few ideas … 
My perception goes in the same direction. 
Notwithstanding the silly or funny aspects of the above letter – both are in the eyes 
of the reader -, and its far-fetched analogies, it summarizes part of my views on the crisis. 
They are explained in a hopefully more sober way in the next lines. 
The structure of the discussion – which must also be seen as part of an ongoing 
interdisciplinary dialogue, coordinated by the Lisbon Academy of Sciences - is as follows. 
In the first section, I argue that the crisis is far from being over. In its continuous 
unfolding it poses fundamental questions on the structure of the prevailing order. Some of 
the arguments in this section are repeated under different guises in the next ones, as behind 
all this and any discussion on the theme of the Pre-Conference lies an enormous dilemma: 
what alternative do we have for the present order? 
Combining basic geo-political considerations with the economic facts may change 
the way to look at, and forecast the consequences of the crisis. Not only as regards the limited 
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debate on “when will the recession end?”, but also in the way to consider several pieces of 
after-crisis rhetoric, as “better and increased regulation of financial markets”. Sections 2 and 
3 elaborate on this, in an effort to embed such questions into a broader, more fundamental 
concern. 
The financial crisis has undoubtedly meant a shift in wealth from the developed 
western North to the Eastern and Southern regions of the globe. However, this broadly 
acknowledged point raises not a few questions, some of them being addressed in section 4. 
Finally, section 5 concludes, or rather, opens the way to more relevant, and difficult, lines of 
enquiry. 
 
1. The crisis is not over yet. 
The first point to be left clear is that the crisis hasn’t finished yet. A peak was reached 
in 2008/2009 but, to avoid a senseless semantic argument on the characterization of the word 
crisis, let me state that it continues to unfold. 
As the 1929 “recession” only ended with the 2nd World War, from which a new 
economic-power reality emerged, the present crisis, like a milder tsunami, marches in, 
sweeping structures, economic agents and established arrangements in its way. 
The “euro crisis”, the “US budget crisis”, “the high price of food and commodities in 
general” are all different aspects of the trajectory followed by the crisis. 
It left open injuries that, respectively, date from the Maastricht arrangement, the profligate 
US spending, partially backed by the US dollar credibility, and the distortions in the food 
market, not the least caused by absurd protectionist policies and selfish hedging and storage 
strategies. 
Like in any system, after each shock, its components and agents try to recover their 
previous positions, pursuing strategies or taking positions that would lead them to the initial, 
pre-crises format. This is evident in the solutions proposed and tools disposed for 
implementing them in the three faces of the crisis just mentioned. But they, and most of the 
nowadays other “crises”, need global though lateral, innovative solutions. 
The euro crisis is a European problem indeed, however its solution shares common 
facets with measures that must be seriously implemented – and have not yet –after the 
2008/2009 episodes. Moreover, it should take into account what its present state of flux 
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means for the rest of the world, even though in practical terms the actual shocks reaching 
economies like Brazil, for instance, are of low intensity until now. 
Sentences as the above ones may lead some to think that I’m pledging for quick 
fixtures to mend each separate burst. Yes, but with an encompassing view. Not only this; 
crises imply pain. Sectors, corporations, groups of people are inevitably hurt. There is no 
solution without losses and cuts. The single-minded efforts until now have been, faithful to 
the resilient features of any well-established system, in the direction of restoring the 
traditional order, its elements and procedures. This unavoidably leads to away out that 
heavily hurts the less powerful, the less organized and less vocal segments. 
It is hard to envisage a solution to the euro problem without boldly facing the situation 
of the banks in the euro zone that hold considerable amounts of rotten assets. Their situation 
may be streamlined either by rescue – and then funds must come from somewhere, as it has 
been pursued until now – or by controlled bankruptcy. In the latter, perhaps fairer approach, 
things could be much easier if, for instance, Greece quits the euro zone. Why stick to 
preserving a failed arrangement if a(n initially) more painful recipe, but hurting powerful 
agents who did wrong, would perhaps be wiser and socially more decent? 
It is also hard to envisage a solution to the euro problem through half-baked concoctions that 
indirectly address the core problem, as it has been tried until now4. 
Without moving from the Maastricht criteria to a sizeable common budget for the 
eurozone– the right way also to enable a co-ordinate unified issuance of euro bonds -, 
devaluing the euro and, very likely, reducing its members, the euro will linger on as an 
unstable, weak and troublesome currency. 
It is hard to envisage a solution to US problems without fully addressing the   limits 
of its projection of Power in the modern world. The troubled hegemon faces today a riddle 
similar to the one posed to the Roman Empire when at the heights of its expansion: how 
many legions could they support, without compromising the social and investment demands 
in the always restless and effervescent Rome? (Gaius Julius Caesar) Augustus (63 BC; AD 
14), the shrewd risk-averter first Caesar, had during his time traced the limits he thought wise 
for the Empire. Beyond the established borders, security would be assured by a host of client 
states and bold diplomatic achievements, the key one being a peace settlement with the 
                                                          
4The last one, as of the week ending on July 22, 2011, being a modest version of the old “BradyPlan”, devised 
by US Secretary James Brady, for the huge Brazilian debt crisis, inspired in ideasby former Brazilian debt 
negotiator and Minister of Finance, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira. 
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Parthians (ancient Persia)5. Mr. Obama is doomed to do the same, at the risk of internal and 
external turmoil … 
This kind of bolder and more courageous approach, sometimes demanding creative, 
lateral thinking, seems to be missing since 2008/2009, being replaced by a sometimes excited 
and always shallow rhetoric on co-operation and dialogue –undeniably important behaviors 
– that has been delivering not much, and when it does, it is usually more of the same. 
But it is not easy to open to a dark, in many ways unknown void a solidly locked door. 
As a result, we’re caught in vicious circles of solutions, pointed out by the more perceptive 
critics. 
From one hand, many agree that drawing on the less organized and poorer social 
classes to save the financial institutions (fis) is unfair and problematic, beyond the fact that 
this solution is usually accompanied by severe growth-reducing measures; but on the other 
hand, without quick fixes, too important fis may collapse, also spreading havoc to the 
economies and … the poor. Half a dozen examples of this kind of dilemma can be produced6, 
as a sad illustration of the lack of alternatives brought by the lack of creativity. 
Another feature this study group7is trying to address, and that is sometimes raised as 
an excuse for the present hard times, is the recurrent or oscillatory pattern of the crises in 
twentieth century capitalism8. 
Without elaborating further, or getting to more technical details, one characteristic of 
oscillatory systems is that, contrary to very sharp but continuous changes – like in the 
celebrated stochastic process known as the Brownian Motion9–oscillatory trajectories change 
smoothly from peak to trough, the duration of each extreme being variable and possibly long. 
Though the idea that we are still sailing the height of the crisis qualifies all the 
arguments in this paper, real oscillatory systems in nature hardly show a steady, constant 
trend. In reviewing J. Madrick’s “Age of Greed: the Triumph of Finance and the Decline of 
America”, Krugman and Wells (2011) point out that, as regards the troubles involving 
Citicorp (and usually caused by its own unbridled operations) a recurrent pattern is evident, 
                                                          
5I owe this analogy to conversations with Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal. 
6Slavoj Žižek, in the first part of Žižek (2009), interestingly elaborates on the example given in the text; though 
I do not entirely subscribe to the solutions he later proposes 
7I refer to the interdisciplinary group and the Lisbon meeting that motivated this work. 
8Rui Malhó dwelt upon this during the Pre-Conference at the Lisbon Academy, see Chapter 8. 
9In formal mathematical terms, the trajectories of a Brownian Motion though continuous are nowhere 
differentiable, being a non-trivial example of a function with such property. 
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with crises as the malaise of the seventies, the bailouts of 1978 (Chrysler) and 1984 
(Continental Illinois), and the technology bubble of the nineties with its international 
unfolding. Only that each time the damage gets bigger. 
Oscillations are usually either damped or amplified, leading either to a negligible or 
to an explosive behavior. The fruitless efforts to dampen the present wave, in dire neglect to 
the causes of its inherently explosive dynamics, are also a main contention of this text. 
 
2. Vapid Rhetoric and the Quest for the Holy Explanation. 
2.1. The vapid rhetoric on greater regulation of financial markets10. 
There is no need to reproduce the several steps that led to the crisis bluntly evident and 
widespread during 2009. Early announcements can be traced back to 2007, at least11, while 
unfettered use and development of derivatives was growing exponentially. 
As known, derivative products can be created nearly out of anything – from expected 
movements of the price of a share to a likely rainfall – and produce a cascade of potential 
debts whose primary source quickly becomes unfathomable. When tied to loans or 
mortgages, they get twice more explosive. Notable among these are the CDS – Credit Default 
Swaps, which transfer to third, fourth, and so on … partners, an initial, concrete debt; usually 
large sums, not infrequently related to government backed operations. 
If derivatives distribute risk – what, in itself, is not bad -, they at the same time spread 
it to otherwise safe markets. Banks, financial boutiques, private enterprises, local 
governments, almost everybody connected in some way to the global financial system freely 
indulged in the use of derivatives, many linked to the sub-prime loans, given the extent and 
pervasiveness of U.S. finance. German state banks, for instance, were big buyers of 
mortgage-backed products, marketed by U.S. banks, as well as of highly leveraged assets in 
weak Euro economies. 
When the original risky loans started to collapse, the related derivatives went into 
default, and, like a castle of cards, also those agents who held them in exaggerate proportions. 
The rest is well known, from banks to economies and governments in trouble, from the U.K. 
and the U.S. to newcomers like Dubai, the Eastern European economies and, in a second 
move, to the Euro-zone. 
                                                          
10This argument was initially raised in Flôres (2010a). 
11In early 2009, Richard Posner (2009) already fully discussed the “crisis of 08” (and the title of his book was 
“A Failure of Capitalism” ...) 
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The first, overall reaction, but mostly in the advanced economies, was to blame the 
absence of control of a large share of financial operations – those with derivatives naturally 
included – and menace culprits with neither rescue nor sympathy. This was the rhetoric 
around the first semester of 2009 and, indeed, countries with tougher banking regulations, 
like Brazil and Canada, had coped reasonably well with the ill winds12. The IMF, which was 
ready to hibernate for lack of prospective borrowers13, rose back in glory, as a major player 
in the needed refurbishing of the international financial order. 
But as the end of the year approached, and the crisis was however beginning to seem 
to be contained, the innumerable working groups and special meetings dispensed less caustic 
communiqués, as well as less orthodox ideas to fix, with rigor, the system. Not much did 
happen though. From the April 2009 London meeting of theG2014, to the April 2011 one, 
under the French presidency, a downward slope of non achievements or nearly irrelevant 
measures, with perhaps one or two exceptions, is manifest. 
Out of the many factors that explain this fairly disappointing sequence of events, two 
seem important to understand. 
First and foremost, the regulatory interests are not clear and involve goals that differ 
according to the position of the country in the world distribution of power. It is important to 
point out that less advanced G19* economies, Brazil in particular, were deeply involved in 
the working groups. Though the crisis had treated them lighter, they truly believed that this 
could open the way to achieve a less wild global operation of the financial system, whose 
headquarters, as known, do not lie in their territories. 
Secondly, a more conceptual issue plays a key role. By its very essence, of all sectors 
in the economy, the financial system is the one most difficult to control. In its modern Gestalt, 
it needs continuous innovation, unending creation of new products and strategies that will 
make room for arbitrage, the essential characteristic allowing for quick and huge profits. As 
long as a new product becomes widely known, and its related market then functions in a more 
                                                          
12For Brazil, an account of how it faced the 2008/2009 peak may be found in Flôres (2010b). 
13I draw, and not for the first time, this lovely image of international institutions never actually ending but, like 
big white bears, taking long hibernating periods, from Gary Hufbauer, from the Peterson Institute of Economics, 
Washington, D.C. 
14The G20 was created in 1999, incorporating 11 big economies outside the G8 and with the aim of being the 
forum for discussing global financial issues, though in a less encompassing way than the one adopted in the 
crisis. It has a rotating presidency and meets twice every year. The European Union is the odd twentieth 
member, under the no-comments excuse that systemic issues oblige it to seat in this group of nations. In all 
kindness, and with due respect to the wonderful European project, I shall refer onwards in the text to the G19*, 
to remind the reader of this subtle abuse of institutional world power. 
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orderly fashion, it can remain as an option for the risk averter, but no longer qualifies as the 
top asset that will make fortunes sway hands. 
The above implies that regulation is doomed to apply to a well defined circle within 
the sector, while well-informed agents outside the regulatory perimeter will be busy creating 
new products and acting according to a fairly loose market discipline. 
Before the crisis, commercial banks lay in the core of the regulated circle, with 
investment banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and all sorts of asset managers making 
for a huge army of well-informed, unbridled operators. As 2009 didactically showed, poor 
market discipline among the latter spilled over to the regulated, apparently safe circle, 
obliging governments to play an unusually active role to prevent catastrophe. 
The area of the circle can, and very likely will, be enlarged; indirect controls may be 
attached to some outside. But reversing this pattern looks impossible. 
Of course, the whole sector may be smothered and reduced to an improved, modern 
version of the old banking system, with not even sweeps allowed15. Though theoretically 
feasible, it is hard to believe this will happen, and the reason is simple: nobody wants it, or 
at least those who detain the power to do it. 
The motives explaining this inner and now - contrary to the first point – nearly 
widespread resistance to such a drastic change are varied, but a main one is that the financial 
system, ironically, is the oxygen of the nowadays world economy. Despite producing extra 
fat for the “well-informed” group, it supplies capital for the major needs of a global economy. 
If curbed in excess, this supply will dry up and we shall be back to a more autarchic 
environment, with less world-encompassing projects and a much reduced flow of goods, 
services, people and … funds16. 
The special kind of activities of the financial galaxy should then be conducted under 
an enabling regulatory framework not easy to be designed. This also implies that, here more 
than perhaps any other sector, regulatory failure can be very distorting. For the minimally 
normal operation of the financial status quo, worse than not regulating may be excessive 
regulation that ends up by stifling parts of the system, while failing to be implemented and 
                                                          
15By the sweeps mechanism, depositors are allowed to move their money from a standard account to an 
investment fund, bringing back each time only the amount needed to pay an incoming, specific debt. This simple 
mechanism, nowadays widespread, is fundamental to give investment funds scale for performing their various 
deals. 
16And we are back to one of the vicious circles mentioned in the previous section ... 
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enforced in others. This ends by adding further costs to society and helping to discredit 
regulators, increasing the lack of trust in the system. 
Discussing a new architecture for the system goes beyond the sheer financial 
narrative. It must eventually encompass the whole functioning of the present world economy, 
its production system and its trade and investment dimensions. It must face the issue that the 
Federal Reserve still is, but for the name, the world central bank. And this world central bank 
is located in the country where exactly some of the most radical changes must take place. 
The turn in the mood of the communiqués and resolutions, watched as 2009 went by, bears 
evidence on how this ticklish theme will essentially not be solved in the near future. 
After the initial bold US and British decisions related to the first banks in trouble – 
and the boldest one was perhaps the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, in September2008 –, 
bailouts, funded by the taxpayers’ pockets, conspicuously entered stage, to rescue, in a more 
or less sophisticated way other agents in distress. As a subsidiary proof of the main argument 
above, the fis revealed themselves too big, too enmeshed with the global economy to 
subsume. Their fall would precipitate that of factories, offices and small businesses; in other 
words, the loss of more jobs and … votes. No wonder, one of the regulatory proposals aired 
– and still somehow under discussion -advocated the splitting of the big banks, so that in a 
system made of smaller units, bad behavior could be more easily punished with bankruptcy. 
Concern with big banks or similar agents led to coining the acronym SIFI –
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, but perhaps the real focus should be on the 
“SIFS” - Systemically Important Financial Sub-sectors, given the way how, through 
interconnectedness, leverage of a given sub-sector can spread damage over numerous 
institutions, independently of their size. Anyhow, either on SIFI, SIFS or “network crucial 
institutions”, the discussion is doomed to linger on for quite a long time. 
Meanwhile, the basic pattern of the system, as outlined here, will remain untouched, 
and its key characteristics largely unaffected. Customized innovation and accounting 
creativity will only be spurred again by the new constraints, and the financial sector will 
thrive on. 
Due to all this, emerging countries, that were not at the origin of the crisis and which 
seriously engaged in the G19* efforts during 2009-2010, look unconvincingly at the whole 
present vapid rhetoric. Though coveted nowadays, as investment heavens and new sources 
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of prosperity, their voice is still limited. They perhaps would prefer to step aside of this opera 
buffa, risking very rapidly to become tragica; but they share a broadly common fate. 
 
2.2. The Quest for the Holy Grail of Explanations. 
Soon after the crisis had hit hard the main markets, many economists and commentators 
started to search for explanations for the (surprisingly unexpected!) catastrophe. The call by 
Queen Elizabeth II, from the United Kingdom, which is at the heart of the present 
Conference, is, at a first reading, a good example of a sensible question put by an honest, 
reasonable mind: Why did it happen? How could it be that nobody (particularly you, dear 
economists) perceived it in time? 
Some savvy analysts, like Nouriel Roubini17, had warned about the looming dangers 
of the ongoing disarrays, but other bright minds, with the benefit of hindsight, turned to the 
task of finding the explanation to the events. Rajan (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
are but two out of the interesting studies then launched, by scholars with undeniably solid 
knowledge. 
At the same time, the quants themselves fumbled for excuses or rather theories that 
would either justify their behavior or transfer the potential blame to other instances of the 
complex engineering of modern finance18. In the midst of this trend, a work just recently 
delivered by Taleb (2007), regained some notoriety. 
In the same vein, but with a broader view, Macedo (2010) tries to enlarge the portfolio 
of interpretations, by adding the groupthink effect and the precarious percolation of 
information and alert signals in complex governmental and financial institutions. 
All these attempts add a piece of knowledge, sometimes even precious, though all 
suffer from an original sin. With different nuances, they provide explanations within the 
system, that share in their innermost core, either a full or a less-well perceived faith in the 
righteousness of the status quo, in spite of its several misdeeds, and an unquestionable will 
to restore the game, with due corrections, as it posed itself before the crisis. 
I hope not to be usurping these authors’ minds, or overstretching the reach of a textual 
and conceptual analysis, when I state this. But Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Rajan (2010), 
                                                          
17 Roubini was no newcomer to the study of crises, as many of his earlier works testify (see, for instance, 
Corsetti et al. (1999). 
18Rui Vilela Mendes produced, at the Pre-Conference, a well-organized and didactic survey of the main attempts 
in this line. 
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though providing good analyses and a few fresh insights, neither touch the heart of the matter 
nor offer really new and courageous routers to sail out of the stand still and its vicious 
vortexes. 
The situation is even worse in the case of the quants, who blindly operated trading 
strategies inspired in models from stochastic physics, backed by very debatable assumptions 
and logical arguments – as the absence of arbitrage -, at a volume and frequency that 
demanded a far more serious attention to the surrounding constraints. As for Taleb (2007)’s 
work, definitely well written and argued, its revived notoriety should largely be attributed to 
the ignorance the general public always had on deeper statistical ideas. 
Moreover, stochastic processes, though allowing for fluctuations and even sharp 
swings, have trouble in portraying sudden and violent disruptions. Either they work under 
the stationarity and the, often disregarded, ergodicity hypotheses, which embody, in some 
way, past behavior, or they allow for non-stationarity. But non-stationarity still is a Pandora 
box of myriads of likely possibilities, the few tractable representations available19 suffering 
from adequate treatment of disruptive, drastic effects. Superimposing jump or extreme value 
processes is an enlightening modeling tool – especially for value-at-risk computations, but 
does not account for an explanation. 
The groupthink argument, originally raised by Janis (1972) in the context of foreign 
policy analysis, has the merit of bringing to the debate decision-making patterns akin to the 
complex operations at stake, beyond leaving more clear the ground for the identification of 
criminal, or at least extremely socially irresponsible behavior. The latter is usually 
circumvented in most explanations, but of utmost importance for streamlining several facets 
of the present system. 
In Jani’s own view, in the groupthink process, group norms and patterns takeover, 
resulting in deeply flawed decisions. The group is valued above the quality of information 
processing, dissent is discouraged if not suppressed, assumptions by the leader or highly 
regarded advisors or technicians go unquestioned, and all kinds of biases influence policy. 
The result is what he termed “premature consensus” and this strongly seems to have been the 
case in both complex fis and the supervising authorities. 
                                                          
19Of which, the rather local, not to say often silly, “unit root hypothesis” experienced undue notoriety until 
nearly a decade ago 
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But groups in charge of so important operations do not live in a cloud: they have 
directors, supervisors, key managers who must account for their behavior, and this makes for 
the need to pursue the groupthink argument in the juridical, eventually penal direction. 
Moreover, as researchers in international relations duly show, Haney (1994), Schafer and 
Crichlow (1999, 2002), the groupthink hypothesis must be subject to proper statistical tests, 
and they are wanting in the crisis study. 
The percolation idea is qualitatively appealing. However, the sophistication of its 
related theory20makes any test of it as one of the contributing factors for the crisis a very hard 
though not impossible task. 
The fact that each approach adds one or several grains of insight is an indicator that 
perhaps this explanatory Holy Grail that will shed light on every dark cause of the crisis does 
not exist. From the inner operation of the system, anchored in more or less historical, 
economic, behavioral or statistical arguments, and drawing on the power of fast connectivity, 
or on the vagaries of the Fed’s monetary policy, one can at best produce chains of causal 
relations, but the crisis as a global entity is more than these identified sequences of failures. 
It lies within the system itself and signals that a major transformation is in progress. 
By stating the last paragraph I do not want to blur the different serious attempts above 
in a skeptical no-man’s land, where no explanations are possible or every explanation is good. 
They have their place, though limited. To fully understand the crisis, its ongoing process 
must continue to be observed, and its more remote impacts detected. That’s what I try to 
sketch in the next two sections. 
 
3. Talking about real power. 
Though informal calculations show that the crisis has meant more than a blip in the 
continuous money flows from the western North to the East and the South (less, in the latter), 
more than increasing the transfer rate, it has exacerbated the fragile economic conditions in 
the US and Europe. With countries like China and Singapore, passing by Japan, Taiwan and 
even Thailand, stuffed with dollars, US Treasure Bonds and euros in their safes, the 
credibility of these key currencies is perhaps more than ever at risk. 
However, efforts towards diversification of these currencies portfolios are still in the 
beginning, and the range of alternatives cannot be said to be very attractive. 
                                                          
20See Stauffer (1985), for a sound introduction to the subject. 
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Beyond a redistribution of power – which, by any case, was and is taking place; the 
question being at what pace –, the crisis has increased inter-dependency and added a new 
twist to the dollar and euro problems. Among the trio formed by these two and the Chinese 
renminbi, competitive devaluations are taking place in a more or less disguised way. In the 
face of the US quantitative easing and the subtle though firm Chinese policy, the euro has 
been more resilient, though its devaluation seems a matter of time. The outcome of this silent 
war may have unexpected changes in the flow of funds, attenuating or increasing the transfers 
to the East. 
But power can also be ascertained by the rule-making capacity of the different actors, 
and what has been seen until now is the ´classical US-western Europe plus standard allies’ 
order sticking to its long-acquired positions. 
If the optimistic regulatory frenzy, prevailing during the G19* meetings at the height 
of the crisis, has considerably faded out, established powers, through dominant positions at 
the IMF, OEDC and other international forums or intelligence generating institutions, are 
recovering leadership in the main themes and fashioning both the rhetoric and the proposals 
to their basic interests and needs. 
The greater awareness triggered by the crisis, that other voices and regions should 
have more space, is still far from producing more sensible and sustainable changes. Besides 
the subdued currency war, a regulatory war – involving state and powerful private actors, 
Büthe and Mattli (2011) – will progressively gain momentum. 
Enlarging the strictly financial perspective, trade and investment flows, ownership of, 
as well as research and fresh investment in, the different strategic or leading economic 
sectors, and the associated required educational and innovation skills, are movements that 
can add serious constraints to broad statements on power shift. 
Authors like Mahbubani (2008) alert that Asia has presented a remarkable progress 
in many areas. A recent study of the Royal Society (U.K.)21has shown that countries like Iran 
and Turkey have been experiencing surprisingly fast achievements in most standard science 
& technology indicators. China, in its turn, has been pursuing a bold strategy in science and 
technology to match or surpass the US by 2020, Angang (2010; particularly chapters 5 and 
6). 
                                                          
21Co-ordinated by Sir Chris Llewellyn Smith, University of Oxford, and made public in the first quarter of 2011. 
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Notwithstanding, innovation cores and educational excellence spots are still so 
abundant in the advanced western countries that they may secure them, for quite a time, if 
not complete leadership at least a highly competitive position. They still hold a considerable 
chunk of assets and human capital and, most specially, innovation capabilities, to guarantee 
them strong positions in this field. 
Moreover, in spite of the shifts eastwards, roughly around 2/3 of the international 
market for goods and services is in the US and the EU and no economic actual or aspiring 
power can do without access to these key markets. The normal and healthy operation of the 
latter can be paradoxically considered a pre-requisite for the very changes in their own 
predominant positions - and we fall in another of the vicious circles announced in section 2. 
Behind economic power lies Power itself, as embodied in sheer military and 
offensive capabilities. Actual control, in real Politik terms, boils down to two dimensions: 
control of governance of key international institutions and systems and military power. 
The heightened debate on defense expenditures in the US – for sure, aggravated by 
the financial crisis –, together with more assertive positions by giants like China and India, 
or more independent actors like Pakistan, Iran and even non-opponents like Turkey or Brazil, 
is progressively obliging it to glide from its hegemonic status to a shared sovereignty one. 
The crisis has definitely put more pressure on fiscal problems that were looming since 
quite a few years in the US and the EU, and the budgetary constraint may lead to a manifold 
of developments, some out of the strict realm of economics. Reduced US military clout may 
be a significant one. This, in turn, may eventually entail a further weakening in its economic 
position. 
A weaker, or simply more contained US triggers unpredictable developments, from 
Africa to the large Middle East, passing through the old Soviet Union states and closing the 
loop in the Caribbean. Power, as in the outcome of a likely currency war, may swing to and 
fro for quite some time. Before a new, shared equilibrium is achieved, tensions and undecided 
situations, if not local conflicts, will take place. 
Perhaps the most dramatic example in the above context has to do with control of the 
seas. To put it briefly, since the end of World War II the US has provided, as a kind of free 
public good to all other nations, the security of the seven oceans. Not that this would not suit 
US commercial and strategic interests, but it is undeniable that any given country enjoyed 
safe sea lanes for its trading vessels throughout the globe. 
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However, China and India are pursuing technological developments, intensive 
training programs and foreign buys aiming at considerably increasing their sea power, to 
protect what they consider to be their “interior seas”. To this it must be added the growing 
instability in the North of Africa, reaching the obscure (to many) island state of Bahrain, 
which simply hosts the Fifth Fleet, a key US projection in the Persian Gulf and actually in 
the whole Indian Ocean. 
This by no means implies that US sea-power will vanish tomorrow or that China or 
India will, in the short run, take over responsibilities up to a point further from their coast22. 
Notwithstanding, the speed of these changes will be conditioned not only by that of 
revamping and upgrading in the two Asian navies, but also by the pattern of contractions in 
the US budget and the recovery path of its economy. 
World governance, broadly speaking, is in a state of flux, but north-western powers 
still hold a mighty grip in most niches. This is true of the World Bank and the resurrect IMF, 
as mentioned above, and also of the present arrangement of the UN Security Council. In spite 
of being increasingly contested in all these assemblies, the established powers still show a 
most of the times consistent stance that secures their combined maintenance of key posts23. 
Anchored in the top positions they control, developed economies continue to be the 
major source of international regulation, spreading their (technical) soft power to all corners 
of the planet. The EU may be suffering from a serious illness in the euro-zone, but this did 
not either avoid or stop its nearly spreading havoc in the international chemical goods 
markets through its REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of 
Chemical Substances) initiative24. Probably and unfortunately, “REACH” will trigger a little 
trade war when other countries start to implement retaliations to its over-doings. 
From turf wars around Security Council membership to those for the control of 
international bodies like FIFA and the Olympic Committee – that oversee, directly or 
indirectly, fortunes related to their events – the advanced economies are in good and 
combative shape to guard their advantages. 
                                                          
22Though, for authors like Valencia (2010), the situation is already approaching high tension. 
23A brand new illustration of this has been the replacement of M. Strauss-Khan by Mme. Lagarde, also French 
citizen, in IMF. Emerging and developing nations, as many times happens, were unable to consistently present 
a competitive alternative. 
24
 Actually Regulation EC 1907/2006, which entered into force (first phase) on June 1, 2010. 
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Nevertheless, in overall terms, and as regards tendencies, the dominance here outlined 
is less stable than it seems. The crisis, by shortening the availability of cash and bringing to 
light shakier aspects of the western governments and their associated welfare & consumption 
states, has opened cracks in the building. Areas where trouble was expected in a later future 
now seem closer to become tension spots. 
 
4. The new actors. 
An interesting contrast with the previous line regards the so-called emerging markets, 
which are far from a homogenous group.  
Until when will they continue “to emerge”? and emerge towards what? Taking the 
BRICS, for example, can one envisage in the coming 20 to perhaps 50 years a world in which 
a “BRICS market” would be sustainable without the US-EU consumers? In larger time-
horizons this may come true, with a vigorous Africa, greater production diversification and 
income equality in the Middle-East economies, and continually rising living standards in 
South America, Southeast Asia and the whole Chinese periphery. But we certainly are still 
far from it now. 
However, having started nearly as a playful clustering of a bunch of large countries, 
the BRICS exercise has been quietly delivering a novel message25. In a half formal but 
regular basis, these big economies have been holding meetings, talking to and getting to know 
each other, and calmly searching common views and positions on selected world issues. In a 
few instances, like in the recent Libyan affair at the UN, they worked in a concerted way. 
This practice signals perhaps a new road for dialogue in the international arena that 
might bear some creative alternatives. In a similar mode, the loosely connected but quite 
efficient ASEAN+3, in spite of the latent „fear of China‟ of its members, is worth analyzing. 
And in a more modest, though culturally very appealing way, the Community of Portuguese 
Speaking Countries (CPLP) may stand as another interesting arrangement. 
Emerging countries in general also became more aware that ways of reducing their 
dependence on advanced economies are worth looking for. 
Concepts like South-South trade and technological co-operation, or stronger cultural 
links with Arabian and African roots, that a decade ago were almost subject of mockery by 
                                                          
25For an earlier view see Flôres (2009). 
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the international community, proved of value when the crisis impacts reached trade flows. 
Though not a panacea, such measures will be more looked for, increasing tension in the 
traditional western partners. 
Before discussing these strategies, one must however ask not only whether the present 
“emerging dynamics” is going to be a long-lasting effect, or whether the enhanced positions 
of most emerging countries are sustainable, but rather whether such dynamics will gradually 
translate into a more equitable world development pattern and income distribution. 
Taking the example of Brazil, the “new middle class” created after 16 years of macro-
economic stability and a continuity of more assertive social policies cannot vanish in the next 
few years. In spite of the fine moment the country is experiencing, this is by no means certain 
yet. The same applies to Peru and Colombia, in South America, to the promising African 
economies and even to such a complex socioeconomic experiment that is the insertion of 
huge fractions of nearly 2 billion people into a capitalist and consumption society in China. 
If changes are not stable yet, the brighter look of the southern economies is also 
partially due to a comparison effect. The relative decline and depressing aspects in the 
developed economies make investors and analysts alike to turn their views to the emerging 
markets. 
Ways to convert this favorable mood into a permanent achievement depend, ironically 
and again, on the evolution of the crisis itself. Pursuing the pre-crisis South-South strategies, 
enhancing the establishment of new markets and the creation of novel channels of production 
and trade may prove of great help. 
Brazil, with the aid of official funds, has been transferring technology to African and 
Central American countries in order to create an international network of ethanol producers 
that would form a sustainable global ethanol market. Similar ventures may be done for other 
commodities and energy goods. 
As mentioned before in this section, flexible forms of association, in which 
neighborhood is not a pre-requisite anymore, can direct co-operation and joint ventures 
efforts. With the BRICS at one extreme, as a group the main objective of which, in the near 
future, is to create opportunities for mutual knowledge and understanding, tapping the ground 
for common international positions, associations like the ASEAN+3, or the CPLP 
community - where synergies can be created by joining countries in three different 
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continents, with an important cultural intersection - can bear more rapid fruits and profit from 
the good winds. 
Unavoidably, this will eventually overflow to the international organizations where 
the struggle for greater control seems a sure event. Brazil and India – together with, in the 
“other side”, Germany and Japan – have already clearly stated their intentions as regards a 
permanent seat in the Security Council. If Africa continues in the positive trend that at least 
half of its nations are treading, they will also soon demand more participation in international 
decisions. 
If the crisis gave other actors more scope for showing themselves up, it will also – by 
the logic and mechanisms discussed in section 2 – make some incumbents more adamant to 
give up their sometimes last share of power. Emerging powers, to take full advantage from 
the crisis, by asserting their new realities and contributing to changes in the present global 
order, must be better organized among themselves. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
The crisis has drawn attention to the fact that not only emerging powers but other 
regions of the world as well may be offering different development models and may 
constitute into alternative, in some dimensions more positive agents, in the conduct of the 
present stage of globalization. 
Notwithstanding, the traditional western powers have not lost a large amount of 
control of the world economy. Since the crisis has become less acute, these very powers have 
sent clear signs that, in what really matters – like key world decision making, or strategic 
rule-making – they will not concede much, at least, much less than what was at some moment 
(during the recent peak) expected. 
Up to now, no region or group of nations has coined up fully new and innovative 
answers to the disarray speeded up by the ongoing crisis. No leader, nation or supranational 
entity has had the courage to either deepen established practices or break with them, in an 
attempt to produce, one way or another, a bold solution, a new reality. In spite of better 
perceived and accepted, those different development models and alternatives do not make up 
either for a comprehensive answer to the present state of affairs. To carry on is to hesitate at 
opening doors to the unknown, is to remain trapped in a vortex of vicious circles created by 
the very system we are in. 
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And the crisis proceeds, reallocating world power as in a Hobbesian anarchy. 
It is difficult to foresee smooth developments in the near future. On the contrary, 
multilateralism seems to be losing ground to unilateral action or bilateral arrangements. More 
or less disguised currency wars may lead to serious disequilibria, and turf wars may become 
more frequent, with motives ranging from securing captive markets to control of specific 
commodities and energy goods, or targeted regulatory frameworks. 
As economic policy becomes even more involved with defense and security affairs, 
the feedbacks from each side to the other seem likely to keep dissent and animosity high, 
rather than contributing to peaceful and constructive approaches. Amore trouble-prone world 
may be easily expected. The path seems explosive. 
Much work is needed to survive in the coming times. 
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Chapter 5  
The Role of Organization and Management in the Financial Crisis 
José F P Santos 
 
1) If the Queen had asked me why no one had seen the financial crisis of 2008 coming, 
I would have replied that those whose actions made the crisis real didn't understand what 
they were doing until it was too late. At the same time, observers who might have foreseen 
the crisis failed to view the actions of those who made it real in a global context. The crisis 
resulted from the actions of several financial firms and their management. I will refer to such 
firms henceforth as “GS”. 
2) Of course, this does not absolve individuals and nations of blame. Surely 
individuals acted with guile, and nations or groups (such as bankers or derivative traders) 
acted under a particularly harmful form of “group think”. Nations and individuals also acted 
in the absence of mutual understanding, evoking the worst of “together alone” (using JBM’s 
expression). These actions created a system failure far more serious than anything current 
global governance safeguards could prevent. 
3) I have not conducted a study of any specific GS and its activities over the last two 
decades, but I did follow such financial firms in the media, and I had many conversations on 
this topic with colleagues at INSEAD and MIT Sloan and with acquaintances in Wall Street 
and the City. I can make informed comparisons between a GS and global companies that I 
have studied, such as IBM or HP, General Electric or Siemens, General Motors or Nissan, 
Nestle or P&G. 
4) The top executives of many global companies have a concept of the term global 
that was shaped in an age of a non-global world or a world that was in the early stages of 
globalization. Such a view is flawed. These managers see global as something important for 
revenue growth overseas or having to do with the universal appeal of their brand or product. 
In fact, what global is really about is interconnectedness, interdependence, and integration. 
A global market does not make a global world. The specific value of a geographic portfolio 
is null in a globalized world. Indeed, the higher the degree of globalization, the higher the 
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overall level of uncertainty – not just generalized uncertainty, but namely administrative 
uncertainty. 
5) My hypothesis is that as the various GS engaged with other similar firms and with 
clients around the world in large flows of financial products—mostly of the acclaimed 
“innovative” kind (read, some sort of first, second, or nth-order derivatives)—in different 
and dispersed organizational units and levels, such firms and their top managers were not 
aware of the higher administrative uncertainty and huge risk the whole thing posed to them, 
directly or indirectly. 
6) I am not speaking of the enterprise risk models that missed the interdependencies 
across different business units, nor about the inadequate and possibly illegal processes of 
subprime mortgage origination and approval, nor about the incongruence of allowing 
different business units in one firm to deal “against” one another. I am talking about the huge, 
compounded interaction effect of unwise decisions and globalization. 
7) It seems clear to me that the top managers of GS were not simply ignorant of the 
real impact of globalization. They also led firms with improper governance. And they were 
objectively incompetent themselves – not because they were “greedy” but rather because 
their remarkable (but parochial) political skills and their successful(but parochial) careers 
took them to the top of large global firms, while they remained ignorant of what “large” – 
not to mention “global” – means to an organization. 
Succeeding in complicated financial deals is not tantamount to managing complex 
organizations effectively. 
8) There are two more matters to add here, related to managerial behavior and 
organizational learning. At the firm level, I can’t help but notice that some of the most 
influential investment and securities firms had been private partnerships for many years (their 
days of glory?) and recently became public companies (Goldman Sachs, for example, went 
public in 1999. The New York Stock Exchange became a public company in 2005). If a GS 
didn’t have to grow, grow, grow the top line (a condition known as “stock market oblige”), 
would there still have been the frenzy for “innovative” products? If AIG had been privately 
held, would it have allowed a few employees in London to bet the owners’ private fortune? 
Internationalization and globalization can produce very tough moments for companies and 
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their management teams, which must operate in conditions of high ignorance and high 
uncertainty. 
Going through globalization under the scrutiny of a stock market, which itself is not 
yet used to globalization, is a very difficult proposition. I would argue that if a public 
company wants to globalize, it would do better to go private first, globalize, and issue its IPO 
after it becomes global. 
9) And then there is the individual manager level. We have seen over the last couple 
of decades that vast wealth was hastily amassed by many of the top managers of GS, as well 
as managers and experts of the units of GS. We don’t really know how having made hundreds 
of millions of dollars affects a manager or the organization the manager manages. And if we 
have a number of such nouveau-very-rich managers as the leadership team of a global firm, 
we know little of what that implies for the firm. 
My hypothesis is that such nouveau-very-rich managers exhibit a much higher agency 
cost to the firm than what conventional agency theory would predict. 
Conventional stock options and similar “alignment” incentives simply become 
dysfunctional after a certain level of accumulated benefits – if they are ever functional at all. 
10) What is remarkable to me is that I have met over the years several top managers 
and leadership teams explicitly aware of what globalization and global integration really 
entail and who were implicitly capable of addressing the shortcomings of “together alone” at 
the level of their companies. I’ve seen the equivalent of “culture-based multilateralism” and 
suitable levels of “mutual knowledge” in several companies. Examples include Nestle, IBM, 
Renault-Nissan, and several others. Interestingly enough, such managers and organizational 
capabilities may somehow be absent in the financial sector – or so it seems. 
11) Why would that be? We know that the financial sector was probably the first 
sector to become “global”, but in the “global market” sense (one market, one product, one 
set of rules) – or “global as universal.” In many other sectors (e.g. cars, food, IT services), 
the quick failure of the “global product” vision gave rise to the understanding that what 
globalization really brought was global production and global delivery for superior 
efficiency. Managers in these sectors learned that globalization was about creating 
interdependent (and differentiated) units across countries, not global clones. Profitability 
would be higher with this kind of globalization, but so too would risk. Managers in these 
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sectors took risks into consideration, although the recent Japanese earthquake/tsunami 
showed that even relatively simple global supply systems are anything but surprise-free. 
12) My point here is that the speed of financial “globalization” was too high (and too 
successful for a while) to show and teach managers of financial firms and regulators how to 
take globalization into account in corporate governance, in managerial processes, and in 
executive development at GS. 
13) Another factor may have also played a crucial role in preventing managers in GS 
from understanding what GS was up to. I refer to the virtual nature of work in many of the 
relevant GS units, say, those involved with “innovative” (and complicated) products, such as 
structured finance or certain derivatives and swaps. 
14) The radical evolution of IT over the last few decades made financial products and 
the respective operations “virtual” in different ways. Those involved in trading or operations 
work virtually. They are dispersed and communicate mainly through technology. (In many 
respects, even a modern trading room is a place where traders are physically “together” but 
“alone”.) Virtual work still suffers from the “liability of newness,” but it challenges us well 
beyond that. 
15) Workers and managers in virtual work have only indications of their colleagues 
or counterparts (e.g. a voice, an email). Humans have not evolved, individually and socially, 
to cope well just with indices of one another. And “trust needs touch” (as Charles Handy put 
it). We know that trust is a central issue in virtual work, and too much trust (with lack of 
control) or too little trust (with lack of cooperation and ineffective coordination) produce 
very poor performance from otherwise capable individuals. (Even the infamous case of 
Barings occurred in Singapore, very far from London, in a classic combination of misplaced 
trust and failed control-at-a-distance). 
The trust issue may be compounded if the object of work is digital (“invisible”) too. 
Ex-ante honesty combined with lack of informal and formal controls may well turn 
into ex-post malfeasance and catastrophic or quasi-catastrophic behavior (the more recent 
cases may well fit here). 
16) But in the case of financial products, namely in the case of “innovative” finances, 
it is the very product that is “virtual.” An old-fashioned loan was also a representation (a 
piece of paper), but at least it was physical (we are analogue beings after all) and it had a 
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referent (the money used to buy a given house, for example) – and therefore the 
representation could be indexed. (There are good reasons why traffic controllers use both 
very modern IT and a piece of paper when “passing” the flight of a plane to the colleague 
handling the next level or approach distance.) A complicated, multilayered structured 
“paper” is still a contract and is meaningful, but it is largely symbolic and without a referent. 
No one really knows what it is about, really. Using digitized symbols alone is a bit like 
dealing in pure mathematics: One can lose track of the real world. People who are required 
to function under these conditions find that the virtual nature of their work becomes real to 
them. They believe that the rules that govern the symbols are those that govern or should 
govern the real world. Such rules become a new ethics. Immersed in a double-virtual world, 
with virtual products and virtual work, the modern banker or trader becomes lost. Viewed 
from the outside, the collective performance of these individuals can appear crazy or 
dishonest or both. Speculation that executives of banks didn’t understand the formulae of 
structured products or complex options seems a bit much to me. I would offer the proposition 
that such executives were confused with the purely symbolic nature of such products. (There 
is incidentally some very recent work out of Stanford of similar issues in the context of 
engineering work.) 
17) There are many and varied elements we need to consider and include in our tale 
to our (virtual?) Queen if we are to notice the next crisis or, even better, to make it unlikely. 
Such elements should include the organization and management of financial players. 
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Chapter 6 
A Cell Biologist Naive Approach 
Rui Malhó 
 
1. Prologue 
By the title given to this text it is easy to realize that the intention is not to provide a 
deep biological analysis to the economic crisis. The aim is only to discuss some concepts of 
organization of biological systems and extrapolate to the observations and comments that I 
have been experiencing while spectator interested in economic models; hence the naïve 
approach. Nor was intended to make a comparison with evolutionary mechanisms; this 
comparison, perhaps the strongest link between economists and biologists, has been the focus 
of numerous studies and critical analyzes to easy extrapolations1. 
I hope, at best, to stir up a debate with new (distinct?) views on an issue which is 
cyclical – the emergence of perturbations (crisis) in a system – and contribute with some 
possible answers diverting from a neoclassical perspective2. There is also no pretension that 
these answers (actually, more like hypothesis) are regarded as solutions; if something of more 
conclusive this text can transmit, is that in a complex system there is always variability and 
thus any response implies a risk. Similarly, there is no such thing in the text as an assessment 
about what is the best model of economic development; only the exact (and non-existent) 
knowledge of all the system settings could predict the winner of "the fight of the century"3. 
 
2. Why have people not seen the crisis arriving? 
I believe that the answer to this simple question is very well identified in the contribution 
of José Fernando Santos (JFS) – causers and regulators were so "close" to the problem that 
it went unnoticed or of low-risk, as noted by Rui Vilela Mendes (RVM). The basis for such 
alienation have not necessarily to do with greed or other wrongdoing of (or dictated by) 
human behavior4. There are numerous similar examples, some of trivial consequences, others 
                                                          
1 Ex: “what economists can learn from evolutionary theorists” [http://www.mit.edu/~krugman/evolute.html] 
2Rational individuals make informed decisions resulting in collective behavior that can be modulated 
3"Fear the Boom and Bust" - Hayek vs. Keynes 
4The simple “trade” concept of Adam Smith seems clearly outdated. 
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with results as dramatic or more. In all cases we can argue that there is the same 
neuroanatomic basis, a cognitive bias5. 
But even in the event of errors, be they a risk assessment, in the architecture of a 
system, or in the expression of a gene, the consequences are not always devastating. In reality, 
in the vast majority of cases, errors are dissipated (cancelled) by the system properties (e.g. 
auditing, threshold detection, proof-reading enzymes). Consequently, these errors go 
unnoticed or cause only minor and transient perturbations. 
Why is then, that after perception of a stimulus, the same mechanism can generate 
responses of such different magnitude? The local conditions in which, and on which, these 
mechanisms are acting. A certain signal that is perceived by an organism (e.g. cell, financial 
institution) propagates in a way that depends not only on itself, but also on the distribution 
and activity of transmitters and receivers of that signal – the network. Making use of an old 
biological analogy6, this network can be seen as a surface composed of hills and valleys. The 
hills and valleys of this surface are subject to continual changes in position, size, and depth 
as external and internal signals vary in intensity and quality from minute to minute. 
Modifications in a single signal can tweak the surface into a new shape. The signal pathway, 
visualized as a ball tracking across this landscape, must continually change routes as 
conditions change so that it ends up at the same place and thus achieves the objective of a 
similar response. Once a response is initiated, signal perception is altered and the surface 
topology changes. If a good network of cross information and mechanisms of self-control are 
present, the organism limits an escalation in the progression of signal strength so as to reduce 
the likelihood of damage. Taking this analogy to the limit, we can consider to be in the 
opposite of the "together alone" argument presented by JBM. This "network" allows one to 
modulate the magnitude of responses within parameters that, taken as a whole, the organism 
understands as acceptable (below a certain threshold). The "butterfly effect" is not deleted 
but it becomes highly unlikely. As mentioned in point 4 of JFS, the emphasis here is on 
interdependence (or integration), not in universality. 
These facts can help us to interpret the causes which led to the event but do not provide 
an easy recipe for the prediction of future events. Continuing with the analogy to biological 
                                                          
5Cognitive bias can be defined as the tendency to commit systematic errors in certain circumstances based on 
mental processes (e.g. perception, memory) rather than evidence. 
6 Waddington, 1957, The Strategy of the Genes 
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organism, one can say that the strategy is that each component of the system collaborates 
actively with all others sharing information for the organism benefit (symbiosis) and not 
something that will give it a competitive advantage to the detriment of other components. 
Making the parallel with JFS, the specific value of a geographic portfolio is perceived as null 
in a global environment. However, if this reasoning is taken from the organism to a supra 
inter-organism level, we find in nature evolutionarily successful interaction phenomena such 
as parasitism and commensalism. I would argue that, from a social point of view, these 
phenomena are morally indefensible and therefore will not advocate any strategy based on 
them. But it is irresponsible to ignore their existence and the inherent issue of the "prisoner's 
dilemma", an all-time favorite of game theory. In fact, in Chapter 4, Renato Flores states that 
“multilateralism seems to be losing ground to unilateral action or bilateral arrangements”. 
 
3. Strategies to avoid future crisis? 
Considering the thoughts outlined above, we can infer that the obvious is to propose that 
the different Member States and institutions agree on a larger system regulation; reducing 
the degrees of freedom, the risk is reduced. Two questions then arise: (1) how to enforce 
regulation? (2) what is the extent of the regulation one shall impose? A regulatory agency is 
in danger of becoming too close to the issues it is supposed to regulate and thus we return to 
the starting point. A regulation that is too strict (tight) will prevent the system dynamics and 
reduce its evolutionary ability becoming (politically) unsustainable. 
A possible alternative, despite a high degree of "wishful thinking", is the greater sharing 
of information between the various organisms with responsibilities in regulation cooperation. 
The availability of this information would help the governance of the different 
institutions, global or local, public or private, and could contribute to minimize the 
difficulties mentioned by JFS on managers and CEOs (points 7-9). 
The accessibility of key sets of data and its developments would also allow a better 
handling of the time factor. A system with strong interdependence among its components can 
get a better [efficiency/response time] ratio which is essential in periods of rapid changes 
such as the adaptation to new environments or the emergence of a global market (see point 
12 of JFS). And simultaneously diminishes the need for an (unlikely) flawless leadership. 
The truth is that the world is too complex and changes too quickly to depend only on talented 
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leaderships7 or reductionist dicotomic choices such as “Hayek vs Keynes”. Bear in mind that 
one of the recurring criticisms to the EU's response to the debt crisis is precisely the difficulty 
to see coordinated actions. 
A major obstacle to this proposal is that in this case, the information itself acquires 
an intrinsic value and becomes a transactionable good in the passage of universality to 
interdependence. An obstacle which is mostly political! As mentioned by RF, “as economic 
policy becomes even more involved with defense and security affairs, the feedbacks from 
each side to the other seem likely to keep dissent and animosity high, rather than contributing 
to peaceful and constructive approaches”. A second type of obstacle is the (wrong) perception 
that over- specialization ensures (or at least facilitates) success. One frequently hears young 
researchers and influential commentators minimize the relevance of non- applied research 
and interdisciplinary work based on rapidly changing or outdated paradigms. Versatility, 
creative and critical thinking require not only knowledge in the so-called "hard" sciences. A 
background in history and philosophy (for example) is essential to deal with a competitive 
and constantly changing environment. 
One final issue related to this topic is the absolute need to internalize the concept that 
no system can maintain perpetual expansion/growth. In the case of an economy such as the 
Portuguese, the probability of getting for several consecutive years, GDP average growth 
rates of ~2 % is extremely low although it is tempting for a political agent to profess "yes we 
can". Any dynamic system deviates from equilibrium experiencing oscillations, more or less 
regular, more or less intense. To ignore this fact and/or use this premise as a way out of a 
crisis is illusory or malicious. 
 
4. Dealing with the crisis 
I believe that regardless of the political spectrum to which one belongs, even an optimistic 
perspective cannot deny that this crisis is not an ephemeral perturbation of the system. It is 
actually plausible, as proposed by RF, that it will result in an organizational change. Not a 
mere replacement of dominant powers but the emergence of a "second world" (Parag Khana). 
                                                          
7 A dynamic “turn-over” of the components is essential in biological systems. 
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In the short term, dealing with the crisis implies recognizing its global impact. The events 
of recent years suggest that most governments admit so but does not act accordingly. Several 
reasons can justify this procedure: [1] Lack of appropriate tools (and policy makers) to 
generate an appropriate response; [2] Fear of adverse political consequences for their own 
interest; [3] Intentional perpetuation of a "systemic stress" in order to induce an 
organizational change. 
Aside the political implications that determine the response to the above listed options, it 
is clear that the impact of a stress scenario (crisis) can be quite asymmetric depending on the 
size and positioning of system components. But it will always exist! This is particularly 
relevant in the current situation where the crisis is essentially of intangible nature ("ratings", 
bond debts, etc). Using once more the analogy of the Waddington landscape, it is crucial to 
establish, with the maximum possible accuracy, our " location" in the system (geopolitical 
region), interaction networks (privileged partners), specific characteristics (language, 
history), and resources (goods and humans). Without this, there is a risk (temptation?) of 
importing well-succeeded models, tailored to specific circumstances, but whose transposition 
will prove ineffectual or even counter-productive. The development and application of good 
test-stresses is fundamental here. 
Recently, and perhaps on a non casuistic manner, various sectors of society, advocated a 
(re)approach to the Sea8 and the deepening of relations with the countries of the CPLP. 
It is an idea rooted on our history and which seems to gain some grounds considering the 
European crisis and the emergence of the so- called "second world". This expression of a 
collective intelligence, probably has its parallel in the seeking and obtaining resources for 
biological systems; in the absence/shortcoming of a energy resource, the metabolism is 
changed to process another that is (became) available and that the system already has 
mechanisms to metabolize. In fact, considering the specificities of Portugal, perhaps the best 
way to deal with the crisis is summed up in the words of the philosopher Agostinho da Silva 
– "bringing the world to Europe, as once we brought Europe to the world"
                                                          
8 Many events and political decisions after the original writing of this text reinforce such idea. 
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Chapter 7 
2011 Pre-Conference Report and Abstracts of Papers  
0. Report on the pre-conference “Interdisciplinary perspective on the Global 
Financial Crisis” held at ACL on May 31, 2011 
Graça Silva, CG&G: 
The pre-conference focused on the “together alone” paradox revealed by the global 
crisis: the interaction between globalization and governance is rooted in “group think “within 
and between countries. Thus several perspectives are needed to overcome the paradox while 
in the letters of the British Academy to Queen Elizabeth on the crisis, the perspective is solely 
Anglo-American and in addition neglects the contribution of natural sciences. The 
perspectives presented and discussed brought together panelists from CPLP and different 
knowledge areas. It started with a “Narrative of the crisis: from dollar to euro zone” presented 
by João Sousa Andrade [1], including examples of different types of crisis together with a 
perspective on the evolution of faith in market economies as generators of never-ending 
prosperity: the crash of Wall Street (1987), the failure of Saving and Loans Associations 
(1989-91), the Japanese crash of stocks and housing prices (1990), the European Monetary 
Crisis (1992-3); the Mexican debt crisis(1994-5), the Asian monetary crisis (1997-8), the 
Russian debt crisis and the insolvency of LTCM (1998), the dotcom crisis (2000-1) and the 
Argentina crisis (2001-2). The existence of a high level of systemic risk was recognized with 
the emergence of the2007-8 financial crisis. Nevertheless during some months in Europe the 
concern with inflation was stronger than the recognition of a sovereign debt crisis in the EZ. 
It was not until late 2009 that the fear of Greece’s default arose. 
After this perspective about beliefs in market economies Renato G. Flôres [2] talked 
about “Consequences of the crisis for emerging markets: a world redistribution of economic 
power?”. He addressed the question of economic power redistribution between emerging 
markets and the so called developed markets, as the financial crisis resulted in a shift in 
wealth from the developed to emerging markets. One question that he raised is whether this 
is a long-lasting effect or instead if it translates into a world redistribution of economic power 
to emerging markets. By adding that behind economic power lies power itself, for example 
as embodied in military and offensive capabilities, the author enlarged a strictly economic 
perspective combining it with basic geo-political considerations. His approach changes the 
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way we look at (and forecast) the consequences of the crisis. Emerging powers may profit 
from the crisis, by asserting their new realities and contributing to changes in the present 
global order. But for this mutual knowledge, as advocated by the 2006 Bissau declaration on 
Millennium Development Goals in CPLP, is essential. To be consistent he suggested CPLP 
is more a combination of ASEAN and BRICS than anything involving advanced integration 
experiences such as EU, Mercosul, ECOWAS or SADC. 
Rui Malhó [3] presented a perspective about economic crisis that links biology 
concepts with economics. He thought of the economy as complex systems in the same way 
that we can think of cells, or of the nervous system. In living organisms, a signal may trigger 
responses whose intensity and dispersion depend on the initial stimulus and on the local 
environment where it is perceived. Similarly a regional conflict may or may not have 
influence on a global scale. He quoted references illustrating this view (e.g., The Second 
World by Parag Khanna). After this biological perspective, Rui Vilela Mendes[4] presented 
a perspective from mathematics of finance, pointing out that mathematical models were 
blamed for the subprime collapse and the subsequent global crisis. However he argued that 
the advance warnings had been there, but that nobody had paid attention. He justified this 
lack of attention with the over riding concern with short term profits and suggested guidelines 
for future behavior by both economists and mathematicians. For the former he advised that 
regulation should not only implement safety measures but also avoid conflicts of interest and 
procyclical effects and for the latter that economic mathematics went beyond stochastic 
analysis. 
José Luís Cardoso [5] provided an historical perspective and illustrated with a few 
examples the significance of new subject-matters to understand the development of distinct 
ways of both economic inquiry and policy advice. The current global economic crisis reveals 
different strategies used by economists to adapt their vision and proposals on the functioning 
of economic life. Facing the current economic situation many economists are forced to admit 
that they were blind or wrong in their earlier diagnosis and predictions. They also make 
considerable efforts to keep their reputation intact by supporting arguments favorable to the 
flexible nature of economic ideas. Quoting Paul Krugman, John Maynard Keynes and Lionel 
Robbins, he described the return to Keynes heard in current debates about the changing nature 
of economics. He gave special attention to the varying discourses and practices of economists 
83 
 
 
and how they relate to changes associated to the occurrence of unexpected economic and 
financial events 
After the discussion between panelist and with the students, the discussants presented 
some insights about the role of CPLP. Francisco Mantero (Director of CPLP’s Business 
Council) started to discuss the importance of CPLP success to other countries. For example, 
this success can facilitate investments and promote joint ventures with financial institutions 
partners. He emphasizes the success of Guinea-Bissau in the HIPC initiative and in the 
execution of a structural economic program and referred to it as an example that Portugal 
should follow. The importance of increased trade between CPLP countries is also advocated, 
in addition to the emphasis on the MDGs. Domingos Simões Pereira (Executive Secretary 
of CPLP) pointed out the difficulty in addressing problems that are specific to each country. 
An important question still not answered is “What’s a crisis in Africa?”. In order to start 
answering this question he argues that we need to understand what are the strategic projects 
most appropriate for each country. Answering the question of How the sharing of knowledge 
is viewed by CPLP, he emphasized learning to use human resources rather than only think 
about exploring physical resources. 
 
1. Narrative of the Crisis: From Dollar to Eurozone 
João Sousa Andrade, ACL and Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra:  
The great moderation, from mid eighties to the subprime crisis: chance or genius of 
economic policymakers. The elixir of economic expansion in the hands of Greenspan has 
created the expectation of a new era of prosperity. The irrational exuberance had important 
disruptive effects on financial markets. The crash of Wall Street (1987), the failure of Saving 
and Loans Associations (1989-91), the Japanese crash of stocks and housing prices (1990), 
the European Monetary Crisis (1992-3); the Mexican debt crisis(1994-5), the Asian monetary 
crisis (1997-8), the Russian debt crisis and the insolvency of LTCM (1998), the dotcom crisis 
(2000-1) and the Argentina crisis (2001-2) were all absorbed creating the sentiment that 
market economies' prosperity could last forever. 
Financial innovation allowed a higher level of wealth in a context of absolute faith on 
market regulation and almost absence of monetary and financial supervision. The existence 
of a high level of systemic risk was only recognized with the emergence of the2007-8 
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financial crisis. During some months the obsession of inflation in Europe was stronger than 
the recognition of a sovereign debt crisis in the EZ. Fears erupted in late 2009 that Greece 
might default; they have since spread to other peripheral countries and governance 
innovations are unfolding. 
 
2. Consequences of the crisis for emerging markets: a world redistribution of 
economic power? 
Renato G. Flôres Jr., Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation 
(reproduced above as Chapter 2):  
The financial crisis has undoubtedly meant a shift in wealth from the developed 
western North to the East and the South. Is this a long-lasting effect? Moreover, even if the 
shift might have been substantial – a point to be proved -, does it translate into a world 
redistribution of economic power to those areas, notably to emerging markets? We try to 
elaborate on these questions, enlarging the strictly economic perspective. Trade and financial 
flows, ownership of and investment in the different strategic or leading economic sectors, 
and the associated required educational and innovation skills are movements that add serious 
constraints to broad statements on power shift. Besides, behind economic power lies power 
itself, as embodied in sheer military and offensive capabilities. Combining basic geo-political 
considerations with the economic facts may change the way to look at (and forecast) the 
consequences of the crisis. Not only as regards so-called emerging markets – until when will 
they continue “to emerge”? emerge towards what? are they a homogenous group? – but also 
several pieces of after-crisis rhetoric, as better and increased regulation of financial markets.  
 
3. Oscillatory behavior in biology versus economics - relevant similarities? 
Rui Malhó, ACL and Faculty of Science, University of Lisbon:  
Many mutually interacting components create a non-linear activity with emerging 
(self-organizing) properties which cannot be deduced from the properties of the individual 
components of a complex system. More complexity is usually associated to greater 
specialization of and cooperation among system components. Examples of complex systems 
which cut across knowledge boundaries are cells, pluricellular organisms, the nervous 
system, social interactions, communication infrastructures, the economy itself. Inherent to 
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any complex system is the coding and transmission of information. In living organisms (cells, 
tissues), a given signal may trigger responses whose intensity and dispersion depend, not 
only on the initial stimulus but also on the local environment where it is perceived. For 
example, an ionic oscillation may confine itself to a small cellular region or spread through 
vast tissue areas - in the same way that a regional conflict may or may not have influence on 
a global scale. The understanding of our molecular and cellular mechanisms does not derive 
necessarily from the identification of stochastic phenomena. Nevertheless, it can be a way to 
help launching new ideas and experiments that contribute to the development of better 
forecasting models. 
 
4. Mathematics and the sub prime crisis: lessons for the next stages 
 Rui Vilela Mendes, ACL and Center for Mathematics and Applications, University of 
Lisbon (reproduced above as Chapter 3):  
Excessive reliance on mathematical models was blamed as the cause for the subprime 
collapse and the subsequent global crisis. By analyzing a few cases, we show that the 
mathematics was there, but nobody was paying attention. Sometimes not paying attention is 
more profitable in the short term. As lessons for the future: For the economists: Regulation 
should not only implement safety measures but also avoid conflicts of interest and procyclical 
effects. For the mathematicians: Economic mathematics is not just stochastic analysis. 
 
5. Economics in an age of crisis: lessons from the past and present 
José Luís Cardoso, ACL and Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon:  
The current global economic crisis provides blatant evidence of different strategies 
used by economists to adapt their vision and proposals concerning the functioning of 
economic life. Many of those who play an important role as opinion makers, and / or as 
economic and financial advisors, are forced to admit that they were blind or wrong in their 
earlier diagnosis and predictions. They also make considerable efforts to keep their reputation 
intact by supporting arguments favorable to the flexible nature of economic ideas. The point 
is not only the conversion to credos that were previously conceived as a path to sin, but also 
the recognition that changing ideas are a natural consequence of a sudden modification of the 
current course of events. This issue is not exclusive of current debates among economists. 
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The history of economic thought offers many other examples of adjustments and adaptations 
arising from the need to explain phenomena that had not hitherto been considered as a 
relevant object of study. The paper illustrates with a few historical examples the significance 
of new subject-matters to understand the development of distinct ways of both economic 
inquiry and policy advice. Special attention will be given to the varying discourses and 
practices of economists through the discussion of how they relate to changes associated to 
the occurrence of unexpected economic and financial events. 
 
6. “Science and society, successes and failures of the couple, between prometheus 
and cassandra” 
Presented on November 6, 2010 at ARB by Jean-Pierre Contzen:  
Providing a science that is as irreproachable as possible, transparent and honest; 
defining a new governance of science; resolving conflicts internally; establishing a new pact 
with the other stakeholders of our Society, politicians and general public; clarifying the 
relationship between science and money; resetting the relationship with the media. 
Academies of Science can play a role through due diligence, advice and 
enlightenment. Is there a middle road to shorten the scientific divide? This question deserves 
reflection and debate in a broader context, ranging from education to innovation. Some ideas: 
considering, when assisting countries, a finer distinction in their scientific 
capacities(emerging countries, rich countries without Science & Technology, poor countries 
with a legacy in S & T, the most backward countries); promoting cooperation at regional 
level but also between countries linked by special affinities; playing fully the card of North-
South-South cooperation; supporting the efforts of international centers such as the 
International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste; examining the role of public /private 
partnerships in the scientific evolution of developing countries; assisting the Third World 
Academy of Science, which is the best forum for discussing the problem and for learning key 
stakeholders’ points of view. Our Academies would do well to follow the work of this sister 
organization in this regard. Three questions that underpin the future of the relationship 
between Science and Society: How to avoid the perception that there is a limit to the progress 
of science? How to improve the governance of science while reconciling it with Society? 
What to do with the half of the world that currently lacks scientific progress? 
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7. The arb report on the deindustrialization of europe 
September 2010 presented on 17 February, 2011 at ACL by Jean-Pierre Contzen:  
The approaches to de-industrialization are divergent and the databases are not always 
coherent. Does “industry” mean only the manufacturing sector? Where is the boundary 
between services and industry? Does de-industrialization mean an absolute or a relative loss 
of industrial activity? What to do? Two options: Fatalism claims that de industrialization is 
inevitable since globalization and technical progress cannot be avoided. Robert Reich 
believes the challenge lies in improving the revenues of the badly paid workers. Jagdish 
Bhagwati advocates the abandonment of «factory fetishism» and the advent of the economy 
of knowledge and services (Larry Summers). To maintain the welfare of industrialized 
societies, it is enough to hold the control of capital, R&D and marketing. Hope maintains 
within developed economies a manufacturing industry, characterized by capital intensive 
products with high added value that use a work force highly qualified in complex domains. 
The proximity of clients in the product development process and the existence of a known 
brand are also important. The keys of hope: organization of the global monetary system; 
equal opportunities for firms; resistance to protectionism; promotion of a good governance 
are among the factors requiring a global treatment (WTO, IMF, G20). Other factors require 
an examination at a regional or national level: strengthening education efforts improve 
manufacturer workforce qualification, thus strengthening innovation; creating a fiscal and 
regulatory environment favorable to industry and innovation within it; ensuring the access to 
financial resources; reconsidering the role of technology clusters in the survival of industry. 
Conclusions: Topics for future action are development of coherent databases, analysis of 
2008 crisis on the de-industrialization; influence of postmodernism in industrial polices; the 
future of developing countries in the different scenarios predicted for industrialized 
countries: will they be the second wave of emerging countries? Is there a role for Academies 
in the discussion of the impact of a sustainable development policy in industrial renovation? 
Yes because academies present a pluri-disciplinary character putting together economics, 
social sciences and technologies. They can provide neutral fora for stimulating discussion 
and promoting further studies on the subject. Afterwards, a dialogue with social, economic, 
and political decision makers can provide a rational basis for the decision makers’ future 
choices. 
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Chapter 8 
Jacinto Nunes: a visionary of the fiscal problem 
António S. Pinto Barbosa 
 
Perhaps the most defining moment in an academic career is the completion of the 
doctoral dissertation. It would thus seem only natural to honor Jacinto Nunes — with whom 
I nurtured ties of admiration, gratitude and friendship — by revisiting, in a necessarily brief 
way, this crucial moment of his career through today’s lens. 
The dissertation Jacinto Nunes defended at the ISCEF in 1956 centered on the 
relationship between budget balance and national income. In his analysis this relationship is 
summarized in a multiplier and, to that extent, it focuses on a parameter which in a sense 
symbolizes, even today, the bumpy interaction between economic reality and macroecomic 
stabilization policy. 
 Seen with the lens of today the analytical endeavor of Jacinto Nunes represents in 
my view a lucid anticipation of the importance of taking simultaneous account of two factors 
in evaluating the merits of stabilization policy. First, as accurate an assessment as possible 
of the quantitative relationship between a budget impulse and its final impact on output, that 
is, what is commonly termed the value of the multiplier. This represents the Keynesian side 
of a binomial. However, even if one is willing to assume the correct algebraic sign for this 
multiplier and also its quantitative significance, it is important to additionally be sure that its 
subsequent practical use is conducted in a benevolent way. In other words,  to guarantee that 
the agents who effectively control the use of this instrument — typically located in the 
political sphere — make an appropriate use of it, that is, in compliance with theory  
recommendations. As we all know, a good instrument that falls in bad hands will most likely 
originate perverse results. This is the public choice side of the binomial. 
Many contributions to these topics have been advanced since Jacinto Nunes wrote his 
thesis. As happened with respect to the value of the multiplier, significant developments 
occurred both in theory and in empirical studies. At the theoretical level, for instance, the 
challenge to the values of the multiplier raised by the Ricardian Equivalence is noteworthy. 
If rational and forward-looking economic agents are smart enough to anticipate the future 
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impact of present budget decisions, what consequences follow to multiplier values from such 
assumption? 
There is, in addition, a subtly distinct point which more appropriately relates to the 
permanent income hypothesis: if consumers/taxpayers smooth out over time the impact of 
Ricardian anticipations (smoothing mechanism) what are, once again, the consequences to 
multiplier magnitudes? 
On the other hand, at the empirical level, several studies have attempted to estimate 
numerical values for the multipliers, many of them stimulated by the occurrence of the Great 
Recession in 2008. The wide variety of numerical estimates obtained, and the fierce criticism 
of methodological errors to which some of them were subjected, indicate how controversial 
this area of research still remains.  
Two prominent illustrations in this context are the empirical refutation of the negative 
multipliers associated with the concept of expansionary consolidation as advanced by 
Alesina and Ardegna (2012), together with the refutation of the insignificant multiplier values 
found by Barro and Redlick (2009) while using data most likely contaminated by the impact 
of II World War rationing on consumption. The IMF (2012) itself acknowledged mea culpa 
in its publicized intention to revise the multipliers used in its own models of intervention.  
If any conclusion may be tentatively drawn from this recent empirical research, it 
seems to point to numerical estimates of the multiplier that were larger than anticipated by 
some theoretical models, though more modern and sophisticated, of post-keynesian or 
dynamic general equilibrium flavor.  
In other words, the simpler Keynesian formulation discussed by Jacinto Nunes in his 
dissertation which implicitly admitted significant multiplier effects on the economy  offered, 
due admittedly do the concomitant relevance of zero lower bound on interest rates and 
liquidity constraints on consumers/taxpayers behavior, a more illuminating interpretation of 
recent economic reality. 
Moving to the second factor, it may be noted that the implicit relevance of multiplier 
effects in Jacinto Nunes dissertation is accompanied by the central preoccupation with 
balanced fiscal accounts. Such preoccupation was, to be sure, in line with the country’s 
zeitgeist but the author’s choice of the dissertation title – National Income and Budget 
Balance - gave it maximum visibility.  
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In a sense it seemed as if Jacinto Nunes feared that the magnitude of the multiplier 
impact derived in his analysis might, by the same token, liberate the willingness of some evil 
genius to use it without adequate restraint. It is in this context that, after discussing several 
alternative ways of intervention, he concentrates on the case which he claims to be of the 
utmost interest: the analysis of the balanced-budget multiplier, the one that does not 
concomitantly aggravate the deficit. Jacinto Nunes explicitly singles out this case as the only 
one which, to use his own words, corresponds to “good administrative ethics” (p. 37). 
Since the 1950’s, when the dissertation was written, a lot of attention has been paid 
to budget deficits as a reflection of possible inappropriate spending and/or taxing. In fact, 
this preoccupation has become a central research topic of the Public Choice and Political 
Economy agendas. Specifically, the recognition and identification of a pervasive deficit bias 
in the conduct of fiscal policy has widely been considered a significant step forward in the 
interpretation and evaluation of stabilization policy in practice.  
Acknowledgment of this risk of manipulation of fiscal instruments by political 
agendas (Barbosa, 2008) highlighted, at the same time, the potential interest in devising 
corrective mechanisms to that bias through the creation of appropriate rules and procedures. 
Thus, this factor, rather than implying a refutation of the benefits accruing from the operation 
of potent fiscal multipliers, represents a complementary consideration which, if taken 
simultaneously into account, provides a more thorough perspective of the quality of fiscal 
policy. Jacinto Nunes cannot therefore be blamed for omitting this factor in his analysis. 
In sum and to conclude, I am pleased to identify in Jacinto Nunes dissertation the 
lucid, rigorous and wise way in which he was able to anticipate in 1956 the importance of 
two of the most relevant factors in evaluating today’s fiscal policy namely in its struggle with 
the recent crisis: the importance of the value of fiscal multipliers, on one hand; the 
preoccupation with the potential abuse in its use, on the other. He was indeed a visionary of 
the fiscal problem. 
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Chapter 9 
Fossil Fuels in CPLP: Which Future? 
Jean-Pierre Contzen 
 
 The reserves of fossil fuels (oil & gas, coal) are important in five CPLP countries 
(Angola, Brazil, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and East Timor). Will these countries continue 
benefiting from their resources for decades? Is the motto “Fossil fuels forever” applicable? 
Or is James Canton, the President of the Institute for Global Futures, right when he states 
that “The Stone Age did not end for lack of stone. And the Oil Age will end before the world 
runs out of oil”? 
1. Forecasting Energy Future: a Difficult Job 
If and when it will end, one may wonder why? Where stands the competition for 
replacing fossil fuels? Some analysis is possible but one should not forget that the evolution 
of the global energy system is essentially chaotic in the sense of Ilya Prigogine. When 
describing the future of the system, one relies on segments of deterministic progression 
(dictated by technological advancement, industrial and regulatory time lags, availability of 
financial resources, etc.) punctuated by points of bifurcation. As Ilya Prigogine and Isabel 
Stengers wrote in “Entre le Temps et l’Eternité” : 
En ces points {de bifurcation}, le comportement du système devient instable et peut évoluer 
vers plusieurs régimes de fonctionnement stables. En de tels points, une “meilleure 
connaissance” ne nous permettrait pas de déduire ce qui arrivera, de substituer la certitude 
aux probabilités. 
 
When bifurcations occur, governments and civil society in different countries react in 
different ways; the stakeholders act according to their emotions, their social and political 
environments and traditions.  
This leads to increasingly fragmented systems, to further chaos rather than to a 
stabilized new system, as represented in the next graph describing the different energy system 
evolutions (characterized by energy diversification) with time. 
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In the energy field, significant bifurcation points have been experienced so far: 
• The exploitation of oil (1863) 
• The peaceful use of nuclear energy (1950) 
• The use of natural gas for energy purposes (1960) 
• The oil crisis (1973) 
• The large scale use of renewables and of cogeneration (1990s) 
• Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) 
• The reduction of subsidies to renewables following the financial crisis (2009) 
• The exploitation of tight and shale gas (2010) 
Will the exploitation of clathrates which started in 2012 be the next point? 
 
2. Future of Fossil Fuels  
Until now, points of bifurcation have been in favor of fossil fuels and in the current 
overall deterministic context, their future looks bright; they should remain the major source 
of energy for decades to come as shown on the following graph prepared by the U.S. Energy 
Information Agency which projects that the world energy consumption will increase 56% by 
2040 and gives a forecast of such consumption by type of fuel.  
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The IEA World Energy Outlook 2014 goes in the same sense, underlining still 
substantial investments in fossil fuel systems within its “New Policies Scenario”. As 
investments constitute a key factor for forecasting further growth (no money, no new 
infrastructure), the next graph displays important information. 
Hence, where are the factors which might hinder this bright perspective? Energy 
sources are chosen according to several criteria which don’t have the same weight for all 
countries, for all enterprises. This explains the existence of a large diversity of energy systems 
which should be respected. “One size fits all” is not the solution to the world energy problem  
  
96 
 
 
3. Selection Criteria  
So far, countries and enterprises have reacted to several challenges when selecting 
their energy sources:  
 Energy security, guaranteeing availability 
 Maturity of technology for production and utilization 
 Economic performance, a question of cost  
 Ecology i.e. environmental friendliness: climate change but also local pollution  
 Acceptance, safety as determined by experts being overshadowed by its 
perception by Society-at-large 
 Mineral Resources availability determining utilization of materials in energy 
systems 
These criteria constitute the vertices of a hexagon. Each energy system fits within this 
hexagon creating different figures (represented in different colors in the following graph) 
according to the relative importance granted to each of the six criteria. 
 
Technological level does not constitute a deciding factor as technological maturity is 
achieved for most energy systems. This does not mean that no new efforts are required 
from a technological point of view, notably in the field of energy storage (from Wh to 
GWh) and energy transport. 
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The same applies to economy with no large differences in cost for most systems, in 
spite of triumphal announcements by proponents of various energy systems. This is 
shown in the next graph and the following table which display examples of energy cost 
structures. Where hydropower and geothermal power are readily available (something 
which depends on geographical location) and accepted (by the local communities), they 
should be fully used as they are and will most probably remain the cheapest.  
For mineral resources, the factor is not a leading one for the time being but it might 
be in a not too far future. Managing adequate mineral resources will become a new 
challenge for energy production. Secondary (recycled) rather than primary materials 
should be the choice for the future but it might take another 20 to 30 years before 
exploiting the right technologies for recycling. B. Goffé (U. Aix-Marseille) and O. Vidal 
(U. Joseph Fourier Grenoble) made an interesting study of the limitations for renewable 
energies development induced by the availability of earth mineral resources (Pour la 
Science, n°431, Sept. 2013). As an example, last generation wind generators consume 
per kWe produced, 20 to 40 times more steel and 6 to 15 times more concrete than a third 
generation nuclear reactor The production of renewable energy systems require notably 
Fe, Cu, Al, concrete (cement, sand), glass (sand plus various minerals, with high purity 
for guaranteeing transparency), chemicals derived from hydrocarbons (resins, plastics), 
In (for PV panels), Nd and Dy for wind energy electric generators. Corresponding ores 
are getting lower in useful concentration due to exhaustion and they require increasing 
quantities of energy. In 2010, energy for extraction and processing represented 22% of 
the energy consumption of the world industry (US DoE). 
Example of a levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) comparison for some newly built 
renewable and fossil-fuel based power stations in Germany, 2013 
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Job creation might become an additional factor if unemployment remains an acute 
problem in some parts of the world. In some European countries, employment created by a 
greater recourse to renewables is considered important. In Belgium, if the transition to an 
energy system based at 100% on renewables in 2050 would be made, the job creation would 
be between 21 000 and 65 000 full time equivalents before 2030, a non-negligible figure as 
the number of unemployed was 368 000 in 2012. BUT, even taking account technological 
progress, the cost of such a system would be 20% higher than a system still using fossil fuels. 
Where is the equilibrium point?  
 
Cost Comparison of Energy Sources in the U.S. (from U.S. EIA April 2014) 
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Among the criteria, the differences come essentially from security of supply, 
acceptance and ecology: Security of supply is a question of geopolitics; it requires a constant 
dialogue between producers and consumers, hopefully not solely between the largest entities. 
Acceptance depends not so much from the objective risk but rather from its perception by the 
political decision makers and the general public. 
Ecology is increasingly a significant factor with two leading aspects: local pollution 
and global climate change which do not go always in the same direction. Local pollution is 
the driving force in many countries (e.g. some reduction in the use of coal in China), climate 
change considerations might get more attention with the COP 21 next year in Paris 
approaching but are not currently at the forefront (e.g. Germany). The following table gives 
the overall emission levels of the different energy sources most used for electricity 
production, expressed in kg of CO² equivalent per MWh produced (The figures detail overall 
emission levels which include emissions arising from the realization of the necessary 
infrastructure). As it can be seen, the difference in emission levels is quite large. 
 
4. Position of Fossil Fuels  
Most criteria are favorable to fossil fuels. For oil, in spite of the volatility of its selling 
price (which has little to do with its production cost), its attraction remains strong. Transport 
(air, rail, road and sea) constitutes still a captive market. Non-energy utilization of oil (and 
gas) as a chemical remains essential in spite of the increasing competition of bio-sources 
(revival of agriculture) 
Emissions in kg CO²eq/MWh (UK source) 
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Coal constitutes an indigenous asset for many countries and its importance persists, in 
spite of its poor environmental record: it will rejoin oil as top energy source in 2030. Use of 
coal has skyrocketed in emerging economies in the past 50 years: Brazil 7 times, Turkey 8 
times, Taiwan  and Mexico 13 times, S. Korea 15 times, China & Hong Kong nearly 16 times, 
Indonesia 34 times! “Scrubbing” technology which removes sulfur while burning high-sulfur 
coal is helping in this respect 
Gas is the ascending energy source: it is much cleaner than coal and oil in terms of Green 
House Gases emissions and could be used, with new technologies, in sea and rail transport. 
Some countries joined recently the club of conventional gas producers, e.g. Israel and 
transport of LNG attracts again the attention as long range gas lines remain an issue from 
geographical and political points of view 
The real revolution comes from unconventional gas, fracking gas (followed maybe by 
methane hydrates). The production of fracking gas in the US has changed not only energy 
fluxes but also geopolitics  
One word of caution should be voiced about the benefits induced by the availability of 
oil & gas: countries with abundant resources should not suffer from the so-called “Dutch 
Disease”, a term coined by “The Economist” in 1977. After the discovery of large 
quantities of natural gas in the North of the Netherlands in 1959, it was expected that the 
country would be economically buoyant but the boom due to this natural resource led to a 
decrease in manufacturing and agricultural outputs with negative effects for the country. 
Emerging and developing countries should keep in mind this experience. 
An evolution of utilization technologies which could displace some applications towards 
other sources, renewables notably, is on its way but slow and facing several hurdles. Electric 
cars, smarter energy systems, large scale temporary storage of energy from renewables, 
constitute the areas where technological progress might have the most significant impact. 
Energy savings which constitute the most promising alternative for the future could only 
dampen in the decades to come the further growth of fossil fuels but not replace them 
One way to reinforce the chances for the further utilization of fossil fuels is using the 
trump card of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The development of this particular 
technology requires good knowledge in chemistry and in geology 
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Beyond its physical storage, direct utilization of CO² in the chemical/ food industry as 
well as chemical and bio transformations of CO², e.g. using algae, can be considered. 
In October 2013, Shell’s CEO Peter Voser mentioned that CCS, along with biofuels and 
natural gas for transportation, “could be the bedrock of our future competitiveness”. Again 
in October 2013, Dirk Smit, a Vice-President of Royal Dutch Shell, emphasized the expertise 
of oil companies in geophysics which could be the key to developing CCS.  “For pumping 
CO² underground, no one has a better head start on knowing how to do it than oil companies. 
One unresolved issue relates to how long the CO² can be stored. The experience of oil 
companies in characterizing reservoirs could help answer the question”. 
In terms of technological development which could favor the further recourse to fossil 
fuels, one should note possible synergies with quite different fields of application, i.e. those 
linked with space exploration and exploitation. Offshore oil & gas exploration and 
exploitation are driven towards a presence at greater depths, implying the use of new 
technologies capable of facing a hostile environment and mastering remote operation in such 
an environment. There is an analogy of requirements for the exploration of outer space; 
hence, there should be an advantage in creating synergies between the two types of 
technological development, one for deep sea and the other for outer space. Countries of the 
CPLP should keep this opportunity in mind 
What remains then for darkening possibly the future of fossil fuels? The answer lies 
in the environmental field. Climate change considerations could be the key obstacle to the 
further development of fossil fuels, if the target of at least 50% chance of keeping warming 
below 2°C throughout the twenty-first century would be effectively aimed at.  
If the world were deciding the effective implementation of strong limitations in 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions, it could limit the exploitation of most of the known 
reserves in fossil fuels would not be exploited, creating a real limitation in the future 
availability of these fuels and affecting the countries and companies future balance sheets 
(see Nature 517, 187-190, 08 Jan. 2015). When looking at the regional distribution of 
resources unburnable before 2050 under the 2°C scenario including CCS, one notes that all 
regions of the world producing fossil fuels would be hit. 
Another threat relevant to the same environmental issue could come from militant 
environmentally-driven investment funds which could divest massively from companies 
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involved in the production of fossil fuels. As an example, the Stanford University endowment 
fund has been one of the first funds divesting from coal mines but the movement is still 
limited. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Nobody can make hard predictions for the development of the global energy system 
in the decades to come but most indicators are favoring the continuation of a bright future 
for fossil fuels at world level. If they are wise enough to avoid the “Dutch Disease”, CPLP 
could benefit from this favorable trend. Environmental considerations could be the main 
obstacle on their path but, so far, the preoccupations of nations in this particular field have 
been overshadowed by several other considerations, essentially political and economic. Will 
this trend last? Giving a definite answer is difficult. CPLP should monitor closely the 
evolution of the position of fossil fuels in world energy scenarios. 
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Chapter 10 
Energy@CPLP drives Portugal’s strategy for open economy 
Jorge Braga de Macedo 
 
The cover of Monocle #57 reads: “Generation Lusophonia: why Portuguese is the 
new language of power and trade”, Bloomfield (2012) states in the lead article, titled 
“something in common”: “there is a huge potential to unleash if powers can be combined. 
Could now be the time?” and the conclusion asserts that “the rest of the world would benefit 
from a bit of Lusophilia”. At the same time, the existence of the Portuguese-speaking market 
asserted by Araujo and Figueiredo (2014) was being researched at Harvard Business School 
allowing me to suggest that “globalization liberates lusophonia” in the book launch and in a 
meeting of the European Business Council for Africa and the Mediterranean in Cascais 
(Macedo 2014a and b respectively). It seems as if “global lusophonia” is accepted before the 
Letter to Queen Lusophonia is actually written… 
One reason for this greater notoriety, mentioned in Chapter 2, has to do with the 
BRICS: Brazil has been a driving force of CPLP whereas the US is indifferent to the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Second, CPLP grew to nine members in 2014: at the 10th summit 
in Dili, after being an observer since 2006, Equatorial Guinea became a member while 
Georgia, Japan Namibia and Turkey joined Senegal and Mauritius as observers. Third, this 
new conception of CPLP driven by business organizations and the large export firms 
associated to ELO, a business association for development and cooperation which is now 
chaired by CIP, the confederation of Portuguese enterprises, is helping to implement the 
government’s strategy for open economy and competitiveness in the EZ. Fourth, insofar as 
other CPLP members are open to their neighboring integration areas and to China, where the 
Macau Forum has become a relevant vehicle in trade and investment promotion with CPLP 
members, their economic potential and cultural legacy will become complementary. Fifth, 
according to ELO, CPLP can drive Portugal’s strategy for open economy in energy and 
natural resources; communications and public works; financial services; maritime business; 
agriculture; tourism, education, health, etc.  
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Here the focus is on energy and science, who turn out to be strongly related. 
1. Nye’s dominance matrix 
First, consider the world system in which Monocle’s “new language of power and 
trade” is spoken. It was described by Nye (2002) as a three dimensional chessboard where 
US dominance on security was accompanied by decline on the other two levels: diplomacy 
(intergovernmental cooperation) and civil society (transnational relations among private 
actors). Macedo (2011, p.21), notes that the first and even the second waves of globalization 
(15th century and 19th centuries) did not involve as many players as the current one.  
In Table 1, the resulting positive or negative G&G interactions are illustrated by 
means of a “dominance matrix” where the four rows of the dominance matrix add “land”, i.e. 
endowments both for agricultural and raw materials to the three levels mentioned, relabeled 
as defense, finance and trade whereas the four columns represent North America (US, 
Canada, Mexico), the EU (specifically EZ), East Asia (ASEAN plus China, Korea and Japan) 
and ROW.  
Table 1 Dominance matrix 
 NA EU EA ROW 
Defense YES NO NO NO 
Finance YES YES NO NO 
Trade NO YES YES NO 
Land NO NO NO YES 
 
Before the global crisis, each one of the regions (NA, EU, EA, ROW) represented 
roughly a quarter of world GDP in 1990 international dollars. The US dimension was key in 
the first two (the creation of the euro notwithstanding) but EA dominated EU in trade, 
whereas ROW is the most endowed in people (one half), land and raw materials. ROW is of 
course the most heterogeneous group of countries: it includes significant national actors, such 
as Brazil, Russia, India (the BRI in BRIC) and salient regions largely ignored in the plot, 
such as the Middle East and Africa (South Africa being the S in BRICS). 
The four rows (defense, finance, trade and land, i.e. endowments both for agricultural 
and raw materials) illustrate NA, EU, EA, ROW dominance, assuming that institutions 
pertaining to each one function effectively. The US dominates the first two, even though in 
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finance the creation of the euro in 1999 may lead to a shared dominance with the dollar. The 
new development is that the members of the Chang Mai initiative trade more with each side 
of the Atlantic partners than NA and EU trade with the other. Nevertheless, the fourth quarter 
of world GDP remains the most endowed in people (½ of world population), land and raw 
materials. The abundance of human and natural resources in ROW disguises the scarcity of 
capital, physical, human, social and political as well as financial. Put in another way, the 
institutional assumption is least plausible there. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) illustrate the 
variety of institutional arrangements between countries that appear close to each other, let 
alone within them. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about their major conclusion, political and 
economic institutions interact in virtuous or vicious circles depending on whether institutions 
are extractive or inclusive1.  
As quoted in the introductory chapter ESPAS (2015) identified three global 
revolutions which could threaten Europe in relation to the US and China in a world they 
characterized as being ruled by an informal G-3. The first revolution had to do with more 
fragile geopolitics, coming from East and South, the second with the frustrated social and 
democratic aspirations of European citizens and the third with economic and technological 
change though little is known about the impact of secstag in ROW.  
 
2. ROW and energy 
That ROW cannot be seen as a residual of East and South is evident when you look 
at fossil fuels. Alves da Rocha (2015) and Ferreira de Oliveira (2015) present reserves and 
production of oil, natural gas and coal for five CPLP members (highlights in Table 2). In 
Chapter 9, Contzen emphasizes that the evolution of the global energy system is essentially 
chaotic. Given current selection criteria for energy systems, “stronger environmental 
considerations could be the key obstacle to the future development of fossil fuels”. The same 
trade-off is mentioned by Wolf (2015) as relevant in the short-run.  
Ferreira de Oliveira (2015) notes that the share of deep water oil and gas reserves 
have made up half of the total between 2006 and 2013 and Angola, Brazil and Mozambique 
account for on half of that. Chapter 9 derives the technology policy implications of this for 
                                                          
1
 Though Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) do not acknowledge it, the “voracity effect” of Tornell and Lane 
(1999) is a specific consequence of extractive institutions. It has been applied to Portugal in Macedo (2003). 
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Portugal and emphasizes “an analogy of requirements for the exploration of outer space; 
hence, there should be an advantage in creating synergies between the two types of 
technological development. Portugal increased involvement in European Space Agency 
programs could be a driving force there.”  
 
Table 2 Fossil fuels in CPLP  
 OIL NATURAL GAS 
Reserves  
(bbarrels) 
Production 
(bb/day) 
Reserves  
(trcubft) 
Production 
(bcubft/yr) 
ANGOLA 9,1 1,9 9,71 26,6 
BRAZIL 15,1 2,7 16,2 752,2 
EQU GUINEA  1,1 0,3 1,3 243 
MOZAMBIQUE - - 100 153,8 
      Source: Alves da Rocha (2015, p. 18; Timor and coal not included) 
 
The complementarity between science, engineering and economics which becomes a 
key source of competitiveness was mentioned in the discussion, together with the role of 
policy in picking up the “right” path and on the combined role of scientists, engineers and 
economists. This is related to the fifth point of the letter to Queen Elizabeth, deconstructed 
Chapter 2: “politicians believed bankers were engineers”. In Chapter 4, the Byzantine Empire 
was brought to bear on the redistribution of economic power which took place in 1453. LQL 
also emphasized group think and incestuous amplification, familiar to neuroscientists.  
 
3. Portugal’s strategy for open economy 
Upon being sworn in in mid 2011, Portugal’s Prime Minister appointed a Working 
Party on Internationalization and Development (PCM, 2011), which recommended the 
creation of a Strategic Council for Open Economy (CEIE) capable of debating measures for 
the economy’s openness to trade and investment flows. Formed in October 2011, it has been 
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chaired by the Prime Minister, and now includes the Vice Premier and the Ministers of 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Energy and Agriculture, together with the Presidents of 
CIP and 5 other business organizations. CEIE has met eleven times to evaluate public policies 
and private initiatives, and their articulation aiming at opening the Portuguese economy, 
promoting and attracting foreign investment2. The Agency for Portuguese Foreign Trade and 
Investment (AICEP) serves as secretariat to CEIE, and the work is prepared and monitored 
by thirteen alternates – who have met 48 times.  
CEIE approved 44 recommendations, available in the Government portal, on four 
areas how to improve financing of the economy, simplify administrative procedures, simplify 
tax administration and develop a coordinated and effective external economic policy. In 
2014, CEIE and ELO have jointly been involved with a project on economic lusophonia, 
which looks not just at the member countries but at their regional integration platforms as 
well. These were listed in Chapter 2. Apart from EU/EZ, they include SADC for Angola and 
Mozambique, ECCAS for Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé e Principe, ECOWAS for Cape 
Verde and Guinea-Bissau, MERCOSUL for Brazil, ASEAN - which East Timor will join - 
and the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese 
Language Countries in Macau. 
The “economic lusophonia” project contains a list of 45 proposals to facilitate trade 
and investment, international agreements, training and capacity building and the movement 
of persons, including schemes for implementation and monitoring. With its associated 
consultants PwC and KPMG, ELO has been investigating specific measures in energy and 
natural resources, communications and infrastructure as well as financial services. Additional 
working groups - on agriculture and sea and on tourism, services, health and education – are 
in preparation. 
This strategy for open economy has a knowledge base. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, it can be traced to the eve of the Berlin conference of 1885, where 
Portugal – through IICT’s legacy institution - was keen to display its tropical knowledge but 
it can also be gathered from the 2006 CPLP declaration on the MDGs. The overarching role 
of the global partnership for development, the single MDG which includes both the private 
                                                          
2
 CAP, CCP, CTP as the confederations for agriculture, commerce and tourism; AEP, AIP as the trade and 
industry associations of Poro and Lisbon respectively. 
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sector and scientific and cultural cooperation can be seen in the “Portuguese initiative” on 
the historical and scientific collections of IICT, approved at the CPLP meeting of the 
Ministers of Science and Technology in Rio de Janeiro in 2003, the Declaration of the MDGs 
adopted at the Bissau summit in 2006 and the ongoing work on the sustainability of the 
MDGs after 2015. 
Cultural perceptions – sometimes called “tribal” to stress their anthropological roots 
- have implications for peer pressure, without which no multilateral surveillance will work. 
While voluntary, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has been more effective than 
the G-20 Mutual Assessment Process: as CPLP mixes OECD, MAP and APRM, its regional 
platforms can build on ELO’s economic lusophonia project, the MDG examples and the work 
of CEIE to show that very diverse countries can use mutual knowledge to achieve common 
objectives in business and science.  
Geographical distance and economic diversity are the striking feature of CPLP. In 
terms of multilateral surveillance mechanisms, CPLP includes 1 medium-sized OECD 
country, 1 BRIC, 2 large SADC, 2 small ECOWAS, 2 small ECCAS, 1 small ASEAN 
observer plus 1 beach-head in another BRIC. This is why I claim that “globalization liberates 
lusophonia” (Macedo 2014a and b). 
 
4. Costa’s kite in the tropics 
Quoting from Costa (2014): “The geometric figure of a kite best represents today’s 
world geo-politics. Think of Washington, Moscow, Beijing and Berlin sitting at a kite’s four 
extremities, connected by sides and shaped by angles that vary according to economic and 
military strength. In the center, namely the intersection of the kite’s diagonals, I position non-
state actors even more dangerous than totalitarian nations, evil powers that can destroy 
humanity” (p.305). Thus examining how the kite “changes when its corners are pulled by 
economic or military factors” is not enough because “obscure forces around the world are 
preparing to reshape the kite, turning it into a deadly trap” (p. 307). Aside from the three 
members of the UN Security Council mentioned above, two of which are BRICS, three other 
(Brazil, India and South Africa) are in ROW, representing states and regional blocs 
accounting for most of the world’s population and resources. These are also forces preparing 
to reshape Costa’s kite.  
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A paradoxical feature of the global crisis is that cooperation among nations becomes 
more difficult when it is most needed: fiction and reality can merge or crash! The implication 
is that negative G&G interactions come from both global shocks and uncoordinated national 
responses, even within Europe3. The global nature of the crisis is neglected: the only relevant 
state actors mentioned in the first Letter to Queen Elizabeth were the UK and the US 
(footnoting the contribution of China and India to the “global savings glut”). Costa (2014) 
includes non-English speaking actors but he neglects the South.  
As implied above, the fifth point in the Letter, that “politicians believed bankers were 
engineers”, suggested that perceptions were key. Nevertheless, the British Academy did not 
bring insights from neuroscience to bear on these perceptions. On the contrary, 
neuropsychiatry and subliminal messages appear throughout Costa (2014). The only diagram 
in the book (p. 191) represents the chiasmus explained to the protagonist at a cocaine party 
in Berlin and it comes back in a conversation with his Polish chess master friend at a crucial 
moment in the plot: the protagonist describes the cyber attacks on a British and French 
official as they were playing chess on their computers and this startles his friend because his 
father had been involved in a similar project, “to cast immense holographs into clouds. The 
idea was to demoralize NATO soldiers and win battles without firing a shot” (p. 382). The 
protagonist’s tweet “nuke thy neighbor is inevitable” (p. 291) had elicited an immediate 
response from the ultimate victim of the game, who confesses that China is helping fund 
Ukraine! Another interesting example pertains to the protagonist’s vision of (SAFE.Cofi)’s 
blood everywhere, which reflected his anxiety about her death (p. 234) 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Krugman says the Queen asked the wrong question. In 
the spirit of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2010), he stated that this time seems different, but it 
never is different4. It is therefore desirable to trigger public debate so as to transcend the silo 
curse “in a world that is both highly connected and tribal” (Tett, 2009). Chapter 4 drew 
attention to the fact that not only emerging powers but also other regions of the world may 
                                                          
3
 The expression “together alone” is borrowed from the 1992 song of an Australian rock band, though Jorge de 
la Barre informed me that there is a 1932 song composed by Arthur Schwartz with lyrics by Howard Dietz 
which became a jazz standard. In any event, the “together alone paradox” in Macedo (2011) attempts to answer 
the Queen’s question: “why no one saw the credit crunch coming” (as mentioned in the introductory chapter). 
4
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) claim that there is a relationship between debt and growth but - as Krugman has 
repeatedly pointed out - it does not follow from their (2009). 
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be offering different development models. Flores hoped these would become alternative, in 
some dimensions more positive, agents, in the conduct of the current wave of globalization.  
The title of the late Angus Maddison’s contribution to the 40th anniversary volume 
of the OECD Development Centre (Macedo et al 2002) was The West and the Rest. Following 
his “millennial perspective on the world economy”, the divergence in per capita income 
levels between Western Europe and its offshoots on the one hand and ROW on the other 
started well before 1820 (Maddison, 2001): they are set to continue in the 21st century even 
as China’s GDP approaches that of the US.  
Introducing the dimension of international development modifies the sides and angles 
of the kite and this may stabilize or destabilize G&G interactions. In effect, current views 
(Currie-Adler et al 2014) emphasize more and more that development paths for individual 
nations are specific even if best practices can be used to improve institutions through peer 
pressure. The case studies presented in Currie-Adler (2014), including the one for Brazil by 
Flores, are consistent with the findings of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on virtuous and 
vicious circles across time and space.  
 
5. Globalization and multilateral surveillance  
Early research showed how globalization improves governance (Macedo et al, 2001). 
OECD countries have managed interdependence within a security community for decades 
but this is not the case outside of it. Multilateral surveillance mechanisms help managing 
interdependence, as argued in Macedo (2011) and in Chapter 2 above. Yet, procedures among 
G20, such as the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), are perfunctory - and nonexistent 
among BRICS. Results in Macedo et al. (2013b) suggest, globalization improves governance 
and interacts positively with democracy among converging countries. Empirical evidence on 
the complex interaction between globalization, democracy and development in about 100 
countries over 40 years is too coarse to bear on the pendulum dynamics within Europe, let 
alone the chess games among global players.  
Nevertheless, the positive interaction between globalization and freedom observed 
among OECD countries does not hold outside. In addition to this negative G&G interaction 
among many players, the effects of history on outcomes show that there is no effect of 
English or Spanish colonial heritage. As for geography, there is a negative G&G interaction 
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for Africa and South America. In sum, kites flying the northern hemisphere between US and 
three Eurasian state actors miss the action in ROW. 
While the 2008 crisis was global its epicenter moved to the European periphery with 
the 2010 EZ crisis. Macroeconomic adjustment in the so called “cohesion countries” (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain) was a concern at ECFIN in the run up to Maastricht and now it 
seems that the EZ cure was worse than the disease because the financial system was neglected 
before the crisis, in both its US and EU epicenters. The mix of sovereign and banking crisis 
hitting the EZ was unusual because of the absence of exchange rate risk, which made 
adjustment socially more difficult and aggravated the perception of creditors and 
international investors that it could not be carried through by democratically elected 
governments. Therefore, the presentation of macroeconomic indicators such as national 
income and debt is not sufficient to understand how risks differ across EZ countries, 
independently of whether they are under bailout or not, but also how they spread from and 
to the periphery.  
Differentiated responses also reflect the mechanisms of multilateral surveillance 
available: those used by the IMF are very focused but not as constraining as those among EU 
member countries, like the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) where deficits as 
well as surpluses are monitored, let alone EU countries sharing the same currency in the EZ. 
OCDE mechanisms are similar to those of EU but not legally binding. Indeed, except for the 
G-20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) and the APRM among most AU countries, such 
mechanisms are not used outside of the OECD.  
Nevertheless, APRM has worked better than MAP, so that the BRIC (excluding South 
Africa, an AU member) and other large emerging markets are not subject to deep peer 
reviews. The basic reason is that, even among the other BRICS, they barely accept the 
pressure of the other members of the club. Like in the culture wars between economic tribes 
mentioned in Chapter 2, there are no “peers”. If cultural perceptions have such implications 
for peer pressure, they are unlikely to broaden the scope of economic interdependence 
beyond the North Atlantic security community that led to the creation of OECD.  
On the contrary, there are pressing global problems like the current international 
debate on the sustainability of the MDGs after 2015, which is based on scaling up the global 
partnership for development, the only MDG stressing private initiative as well as scientific 
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and cultural cooperation. If pressure for collective action rises through international 
governance innovation, tribal rivalries and ideological disputes might abate. 
Yet the implicit dilemma “feed or starve the beast” is common in references to the 
mounting public debt in the UK and the US as justifications to cut spending and taxes. It 
reinforces the relevance of the adverse effects of improved terms of trade when the tax base 
is appropriated by a small number of interest groups, the so-called voracity effect (Macedo, 
2003). This G&G interaction, present in the global redistribution of wealth from the North to 
the South and the West to the East (OECD, 2010), begins with Marx’s fear that in future 
capitalist China and India would exert pressure on socialist Britain. Such redistribution, 
effected through imbalances in external payments, may reflect a “game for global 
supremacy” being played in central Europe but the EZ game often neglects the ROW.  
In fact intra-EZ payments imbalances are seen as being of lesser import than the need 
for industrial democracies to manage the deficit bias of budgetary institutions as a way of 
holding on to their credit ratings. Moreover, the “beast” need not be identified with the taxing 
power of the state because the balance of payments constraint applies to private as much as 
to public borrowing. It is in this regard that the traditional divide between the West and the 
rest morphs into a rift between the saving East and the consuming beast. 
The world re-distribution of wealth could revive long forgotten philosophical 
traditions as we move from the ideal of equality to that of wisdom, according to Delsol 
(2011). As she says in the introduction to her Age du Renoncement, when we are between 
paradigms we believe the old one will be replaced by chaos. If the uncertainty surrounding a 
transition brought about by massive wealth transfers exacerbates concerns over the 
deteriorating quality of economic growth brought about by the spread of western patterns of 
mass consumption to masses in the South and the East, it may well accelerate a new paradigm 
of renunciation. Cohen (2012) has a convincing perspective on happiness, stemming from 
his earlier demonstration that rather than too much globalization, there is not enough of it. 
This is both cause and effect of lack of trust within and between nations.  
As mentioned in Macedo (2012), bringing economic and financial differentiation into 
the picture entails the broader geographical domain of CPLP and Portuguese speaking 
migrant communities scattered across the globe. National differentiation which cuts across 
history and geography can be grounded on culture-based multilateralism, like the Bissau 
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declaration on MDGs in CPLP. This declaration explicitly mentions “mutual knowledge” as 
a lever, alongside political will and financial clout, for the management of culture-based 
multilateralism, attempting “silo busting” (Tett, 2009, 2012) within organizations and nations 
is only the beginning 5.  
It is worth mentioning that the evolution of cooperation between Portugal and its 
former African colonies, helped by their recognition in 1992 as a region for the purposes of 
European development cooperation, began in the first two areas of the dominance matrix, 
defense and finance, well before the formal establishment of CPLP. Yet Brazil joined little 
by little while East Timor and Equatorial Guinea joined immediately the annual meetings 
convened by Banco de Portugal since 1990 and the military exchanges, On the contrary 
progress on trade has been very slow, in part because trade between CPLP members and their 
neighbors is very constrained, with the exception of Portugal. The reality of culture-based 
multilateralism within CPLP is therefore less salient in the usual areas of language and trade 
than it is in the other in defense, finance and perhaps energy. This need not be reflected in 
the existence of regular Ministerial Meetings since those on Culture or Science and 
Technology started well before those on the Economy or Energy, the latter being set to be 
inaugurated in May, 2015. 
Maddison’s expression is used in the subtitle to Ferguson (2011) to motivate the same 
questions (phrased as: How did the West overtake its Eastern rivals? And has the zenith of 
Western power now passed?) and offering the same answer: “beginning in the fifteenth 
century, the West developed six powerful new concepts that the Rest lacked: competition, 
science, the rule of law, modern medicine, consumerism, and the work ethic. These were the 
‘killer applications’ that allowed the West to leap ahead of the Rest; opening global trade 
routes, exploiting new scientific knowledge, evolving representative government, more than 
doubling life expectancy, unleashing the industrial revolution, and hugely increasing human 
productivity”. Differently from Maddison, Ferguson argues that the days of Western 
predominance are numbered because the Rest have finally downloaded the six killer apps the 
West once monopolized – while the West has literally lost faith in itself. 
                                                          
5 Challenging the neglect of culture in multilateral affairs and engaging the economics of happiness helps 
implement the MDGs and reinforces the global common good (Macedo and Macedo, 2011). 
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The projections contained in Maddison (2007), his macroeconomic history of the 
world, were updated by Mold (2010) to take into account the upsurge in economic growth in 
much of the developing world up to the crisis: in 2030 the “Rest” accounts for nearly 70% of 
the global economy, compared to just 45% in the base year of 1990. 
 
6. The need for international governance innovation 
To conclude, I offer some reflections on fiction as a political tool and come back to 
the need for international governance innovation mentioned in the previous section. It is 
worth remembering that, at the turn of the century, the BRICS acronym presented the view 
that the emergence of a global middle class would deepen and widen the appetite for western 
mass consumption patterns, from food to cars. The resulting pressure on non-renewable 
resources suggests that the “game for global supremacy” has a bearing on the together alone 
paradox. The change in perception brought about by the crisis has also generated calls for a 
new social contract, which were conspicuously absent during the Great Moderation. The 
“neither austerity nor growth” rallying cry echoes the cold war dictum “ni rouges ni morts”, 
around which nouveau philosophe André Glucksman built his 1983 La Force du Vertige. 
Yet the pendulum protagonist would nod in approval at James Galbraith, the veteran 
of “economic culture wars” of the mid-1990s quoted in Chapter 2 when he wrote in Le 
Monde: “In truth the protestors of Greece and Spain and Italy, the voters of France and the 
Occupy Movement in America, who oppose austerity, do not clamor for growth. They do not 
care about profits or even all that much about wages. What they want, mainly, is to protect 
the institutions that make their lives tolerable, safe and attractive. These are health care, 
education, local public services, culture, the environment and the right to retire in modest 
comfort at a reasonable age. These citizens know where their interests lie. In modern life 
schools, universities, clinics, hospitals, clean and safe streets and secure future are not 
expendable. They have become the central features of life, the sum-and-substance of desire 
and happiness. Cars, computers, booze, and tobacco, these are the extras now. The companies 
who make them seek profits, and therefore growth.  But the people would take solidarity 
instead, if they could.”  
For him, in the US solidarity and social progress rose from slavery, and the great 
struggle over the limits of solidarity has always been racial, while in Europe it arose from 
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war. He acknowledges that “the idea that solidarity must extend across nations has not yet 
taken hold. Germans never promised to pay Spanish pensions; they took it as a European 
principle that they would never have to. But today Spain is in debt trouble, and the practical 
issue is whether Spaniards – or the Portuguese, or the Greeks – can have any social 
protections at all, if they stay in Europe”. Galbraith (2012) points out that those who argue 
that the austerity moment is passing add that fashionable opinion offers the growth alternative 
and adds: “growth is only a goal. It is not a policy. And every lobbyist, political hack and 
ten-cent crank has a strategy to make growth happen. The details consist of whatever it was 
they most wanted beforehand”. He goes on to say that this “is nonsense and most people see 
that clearly. If austerity was a deceit, growth is a chimera”.  
Roberto Unger (2009), the “Minister of the Future” in the Lula administration in 
Brazil, provides a Southern echo when he announces that “The world is bent under the yoke 
of a dictatorship of no alternatives” and therefore that “The task of the imagination is to do 
the work of crisis without crisis. Imagination, imagination, imagination to the rescue”. We 
are far from the apparent chaos in Delsol (2011)! 
After 2008, governance responses to globalization were largely uncoordinated, and 
negative G&G interactions were the norm. In other words, the “together alone” paradox is a 
feature of the dominance matrix in Table 1 above not just between North America, Europe 
and East Asia, but within each of these groupings and ROW. Differences to be invented 
connote international governance innovation and will be part of positive G&G interactions 
to the extent that they are supported by multilateral surveillance frameworks such as those 
found within the OECD, the EU or even in the APRM, but sadly not among the G-20 or even 
the BRICS.  
While there are no Letters to Queens in Costa (2014) and the novel neglects the South 
altogether, providing a global plot with central Europe at the center helps both showing how 
fiction can be a political tool and the need for governance innovations capable of bringing 
about peer pressure between the middle income countries. Sequels will no doubt globalize 
the plot beyond the non-state actors that shape the US-Germany-Russia-China kite allowing 
for lusophilia and several of the acronyms used above. 
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